Talk:Syria news/Current

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for discussion older than December 2018 see the Archive

Proposal

Hey Folks, I thought about renaming "Syria News" to "Middle East News" as the events are (unfortunately) spreading out and we could cover broader issues as we do already. I would

  • Rename the headline on the front page to "Middle East News"
  • archive the 2023 content
  • put a disclaimer over the archive section at the end of the page saying something like "This news section was called "Syria News" until 2024"
  • no change to the filename of this page would have to be done as it is in an iFrame and none but us sees that name

Thoughts? And thanks for keeping this wiki alive! --CE (talk) 04:22, 9 February 2024 (UTC)

Fine by me, with the caveats, (a) do we have enough contributors to actually do it ? (will help if you are back to contributing) (b) Israel at present is very divisive, on more than one level, even among the contributors, and on "left"/"right" divide more broadly, and so there are dangers involved. I found it lately (more) difficult for me to contribute much about this (improving anything on the ground seems next to impossible, nor changing people' standings and beliefs systems. Ukrainian slaughter may be preventable; Middle Eastern, may need supernatural interventions). --Resup (talk) 06:13, 9 February 2024 (UTC)
Also at present this seems especially complicated. Significant component of big middle eastern wars of the past was a proxy stand-off between Soviet and Western blocks. Presently Russia -USA relations are at or near the lowest point of all time, due to their proxy war in Ukraine in particular, which, which in addition to leadership crises and economic upheaval largely prevents them from a constructive leadership. It is not only them as major players now, but players like Iran, Turkey, Israel, SA are less influenced by things like social media and OSINT (and some of them have older books on their shelves) . There may be a way, but it does not seem apparent. Of course it would be great if something can be done --Resup (talk) 16:34, 9 February 2024 (UTC)
Hi Resup, thanks for your input. I thought of this idea because strictly seen neither the Houthis nor the PMU nor Hamas are directly part of the Syria topic. Indirectly the are, of course, and I have no problem with them being covered. We can broaden that on a "everything is connected", or as you say "the world is a mess" ( I completely agree) basis, but then it is really impossible to cover in such a format. We have added very little opinion to the tickers so far, only in that of course it is due to our opinion what we consider relevant. So I don't think much would change, only the title to reflect the content. I have meanwhile sorted out some personal mess and think I will again contribute more. I'm in no hurry to do the proposed things, though, so lets wait if others want to add their opinions. --CE (talk) 20:31, 9 February 2024 (UTC)
Thanks CE. A name change makes sense as the Syria news feature is already effectively used in that way.
I usually come and go on the site and prefer trying to focus more narrowly on a few topics, but it could be worthwhile to have some reference points to help trace the wider escalations. Developments can often get ahead of my attempts to categorize them, as has happened with everything around the Yemenis recently. --Diagonal (talk) 09:54, 10 February 2024 (UTC)
Thanks, Diagonal. So I'll do what in fact is only a change of label sometime in the near future. --CE (talk) 13:19, 10 February 2024 (UTC)
Done. Davai! :o) --CE (talk) 00:46, 11 February 2024 (UTC)
I'll reverse this. Resup, you were right that we don't have the energy and manpower to cover it all. With "al Shifa" and stuff- Let's stick to our core topics. I'm just so tired of it all. --CE (talk) 01:27, 3 April 2024 (UTC)

2021

CW restart claims (links, Dec 17, mainpage). Isopropanol may be used as antiseptic (while not being drinkable unlike ethanol). Quantities of 350- 450 tons per year are quite small for 17.5 mln listed population, and are about 3.4 kg per soldier for the listed 139K army size. Tricalcium phosphate or other precursors quantities are not provided. In general, obviously Israelis and Iranians are both making conflict preparations, and neither have big hurdles in operating in Syria. --Resup (talk) 17:52, 17 December 2021 (UTC)

December 2018 - Turkey threatens and US withdraws

This latest development is really stunning. If the Rojava Kurds have any sense left after Trump's announcement of withdrawal and Erdogan's threats, they must run as fast as they can to Damascus and invite the SAA to return to Rojava on almost every terms. That's IMHO the only way to avoid a Turkish invasion which would be a terrible massacre, the end of all their achievements and the end of Syria in the current borders. --CE (talk) 12:16, 20 December 2018 (UTC)

Western mainstream media attacked the decision. Which was floated in Trump's election campaigns, then repeated and abandoned in alteration, in between two Tomahawk strikes, over some Russians. Until that Erdogan's shtick in the news?

In Russian sources, some doubt this is for real, and not different from what it seems. With the Kurds, likely initial/natural sympathy but after they caused a strike killing 2 to 3 hundred Russian contractors, as per Strelkov and friends (+ them controlling the richest oil fields, as far as the bosses are concerned) there may be little enthusiasm to specially defend them. It is likely that it will be left for Assad to do; the latter will require Syrian state in control. Such negotiations happened in the past, without an agreement. Some patriotic opposition figures praised Trump as an example to Putin to follow the suit and get out of Syria. --Resup (talk) 12:38, 20 December 2018 (UTC)

October 2019 - Deja-Vu

Kurdish allies? US has a history of abandoning (Kissinger's “covert action should not be confused with missionary work”); in Trump's version, they are "special people and wonderful fighters" , and "we are helping the Kurds financially/weapons!". Israelis, sympathetic, but won't fight for them (comments noted to the effect that days when Americans are expected to sort out things are gone). Armenia, not enough weight/resources to take it on. Russia may be, abstractly, lukewarm positive, but with Kurds controlling oil resources, + Turkey an important (economic) partner, Russia will look the other way (+ earlier comment on causing death of hundreds of Russian contractors still applies, as far as Russian vets/patriotic movements, and by extension the ordinary people are concerned). US vets, commoners, and whether it's relevant, unsure --Resup (talk) 23:25, 8 October 2019 (UTC)

I can only repeat what I wrote last time. And the signs are a bit better than last time (as they should, how stubborn can the Kurds be?) - Russia has forced both AA and the Government, and Intelligence of Syria and Turkey, to negotiate and it even has opened a military bridge over the Euphrates in recent days. --CE (talk) 12:10, 9 October 2019 (UTC)

2024

Post-Ukrainian force dominates pre -? Contributing to the meltdown could be drones use. "HTS" was mentioned to have large number of drones (though visual evidence not seen here). That would be significant as: SAA does not have that many drone operators, or EW devices. It also does not have covered positions. Apart from cities, but it is not taking a fight in cities. Probably because there are too many civilians, too many for them to fight in the cities and not being monsters. It also takes the spirit, and religious force fighting seculars, and imperfect ones. This may be not unlike Azerbaijan forces, backed by Turkey's UAV tech, totally beating Armenian forces, who were like sitting ducks, with no cover, in the open. Here, Russians are to busy elsewhere, and likely cannot give operators, or EW, or even drones. Iran is said to fly some drones from its territory, but this can be unmatched , on quantity and on quality. Because there is no way for HTS to fight without strong supplies, and the suppliers do have post-Ukr experience. --Resup (talk) 06:30, 7 December 2024 (UTC)

It was always a risky game to collect the "rebels" and send them in green busses to Idlib. They had several years to reconcile and Jolani came out as the strongest man. A timebomb that had to fuse sometime. The Ukrainians are bragging about giving HTS help with drones and stuff, so that might be a very significant point to the mighty way in which the bomb exploded. But the main point is that the SAA is unwilling/unable to fight. I don't think it's necessarily a lack of support for Assad, but the whole society is so fatigued through the sanctions that there is a lack of will. Russia was strong enough to withstand the crippling sanctions, but Syria isn't, in the long run which now seems to end. I see Assad gone in very short time and hope he is able to flee with his family and doesn't have to share the fate of Gaddafi. My only positive note is that if what Zelin describes is true, that model of government could be compatible with the one of Rojava, and we could maybe see something really innovative coming out of it. --CE (talk) 09:16, 7 December 2024 (UTC)
In the end of the day, it seems mostly because after 5 decades of Assad family in power, and all that comes with that, too few were eager to defend him, against a sudden well-prepared push. Drones could be a factor in a fight, but there was not much of a fight. High Sunni to Shia ratios could be a factor too (but statues were toppled in Tartus and Latakia too)--Resup (talk) 12:32, 8 December 2024 (UTC)

Assads and a group of tovarishi?

apparently a recent photo, but note Arabic on the wall and English captions; see also Cassad, where it comes across as possibly first photo on arrival. Location and circumstances, unclear. A user claims this is from 2013, but I could not find it. --Resup (talk) 23:08, 8 December 2024 (UTC)

I'd say this is certainly an old picture. Assad looks like this could be 2013 or even earlier indeed. --CE (talk) 23:30, 8 December 2024 (UTC)
Old, located as Assads visiting a children's hospital --Resup (talk) 00:30, 9 December 2024 (UTC)

"National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces"?

After the collapse of Assad rule, suddenly "National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces" aka SNC/SNRC popped up from somewhere, to declare on Twitter and TASS its intend to form a "diversity equality and inclusion" government --Resup (talk) 15:20, 8 December 2024 (UTC)

Ukrainian drones =

"Pravda Shuravi", and Western media: 20 drone operators, 150 drones, sent 4-5 weeks before the insurgency started --Resup (talk) 16:06, 12 December 2024 (UTC)

Military bases

Sputnik: Russian officials are in contact with representatives of the armed Syrian opposition, "whose leaders have guaranteed the safety of Russian military bases ...

Oleg Blokhin: ...by firing in the air, "shouting for Alla", no direct fire contact (yet?)

...and diplomatic missions in Syria"

--Resup (talk) 19:44, 8 December 2024 (UTC)

Fightebomber: "Commenting on the respected one, only spoils.

But I would like to address our Israeli partners. Tovarishsches Jews, please, do not fuck the Syrian airfields yet, some of them have our servicemen, about whom we remember, but no one told you about them. And with your strikes, you can kill them a little. So far they have had a lucky escape, but there is no need to repeat it.

Then you can smash everything there into rubble."

--Resup (talk) 12:04, 9 December 2024 (UTC)

Post-Assad opposition

  • Maher Assad, "in Iraq", posted December 11, 2024
  • Social Media Video squad, posted December 11, 2024
  • "Protests in Damascus at Umayyad Square. A crowd of protesters calls on the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorists, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, to step down". Video making rounds on pro-Shiite Media, posted December 11, 2024


Not making any good vs. bad judgments here, just a list --Resup (talk) 16:06, 12 December 2024 (UTC)

Criticism, commentsary

It's not like not understandable where PCR is coming from, but it really shows his basic misunderstanding of the Russia thing, at many levels of it. To begin with, Russia announced formal withdrawal from Syria in 2016, And again, in 2017. Although it maintained the bases and a degree of presence in Syria after that, it was not deeply involved in fixing Syria. It has more to do with geopolitical affairs (or symbolism), and with a base for operations in Africa, not with fixing Syria. It was preoccupied with the interests of its own elites, and increasingly with Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian patriotic opposition (of Strelkov kind) favored abandoning Syrian and African projects, and focusing on Ukraine and internal matters; in particular, since Russian operations in Syria, especially supply lines, were deeply vulnerable; and there were not enough human, economic, or military resources for a robust and military meaningful presence. It was in effect a vulnerable forward post, more for demo and bargaining purposes than suitable for real fights. Moreover, persistent opposition talk was that Russia was lured to Syria to fight IS by the Obama administration, hoping for preferences in Ukraine, which were never received, and overall relations becoming increasingly terrible. So Syria became kind of 'a suitcase without a handle', a dumping ground for failing generals or overstock warriors, + grey area projects and funding schemes, + a bargaining chip in various diplomatic projects. So it was never fully "bought" , and so it cannot be now "sold", as PCR claims. Reality is that of course Russia understands the symbolism of all this, but it simply does not have the resources, from human to existential, to do considerably more than it did. Besides, Russia is not fully controlled by the presidency, especially in recent years. There are various MIC and business elites, not just the 'forces'; and 'forces' are mixed with business and MIC. Recent major purges of top military brass indicate that the situation at the top is rather fluid, and not identical to the preceding 20+ years of 'Putin classic'. With this, Syria, or PCR's world order preferences, appears to be just not at the very top of Kremlin's agenda right now. Besides, Russia never has been in the 'axis of resistance'. this is all circumstantial and for the most part driven by the rejection of its core interests in Washington, DC. --Resup (talk) 20:42, 16 December 2024 (UTC)

  • Oleg Blokhin interview (Rus, video;automatic subs), 17 Dec. 2024
    Insightful interview of former (Western and Ru) PMC, turned war correspondent. Briefly the points:
    • Asssad inherited and did not improve system of government which is dysfunctional/corrupt/tribal or feudal, from the modern/Western perspective. That included: arbitrary extortions at the checkpoints, resulting in 8-fold or so price increases when stuff finally reaches markets; arbitrary applications of law; conditions impossible for private business unless it has connections or protection by the state, or selected by the state/Assad/'regime' for the role. People not following all that arbitrarily arrested or harassed; mukhbarats aggressively creating or manufacturing evidence to justify detentions. Mukhabarats treated Russians as enemies, just temporary allies. Air intelligence was friendlier. In Kurdish areas, the governance was more Western-like. At people-to-people level, there was no animosity towards Russians; Russian-American relations were OK (occasional help, occasional tensions).
    • Russians after 2020 did not have a plan or purpose in Syria. Were warm-hearted and even-handed to all, and not interfering in whatever was happening. Which may not be the way to keep things in check. There was no profitable Russian business in Syria, only a few money-loosing projects. Essentially, there was nothing financial/material to lose, and no vision/concept/ideology either
    • Iranians over-extended themselves, tightly controlling their areas, and push===ing religious/ideological agenda. It turned many against Iranians. Their relations with Russians were competitive
    • Takeover was engineered by Turkey, and backed by the British (by media support, in pursuit of financial or "imperial" agendas), in his view. --Resup (talk) 13:27, 17 December 2024 (UTC)

2025

Latakia, Tartus clashes

Seems too early to tell. Serious uprisings need funding and weapons. The gov may be supplied via Turkey and by Sunni states. It is not likely Russians will seriously support, apart from negotiating tool to keep the bases; and supply by sea is largely affected by Turkey. Iraq border is not really close, and seems to need either Kurds or IS backing them up. In the Ukrainian conflict, some partisans would appear once in a while, then fold, when allocated resources dry up. Not like impossible, but too early to tell. --Resup (talk) 13:25, 7 March 2025 (UTC)

This sectarian "ex"-Headchopper "caretaker" government is provoking counter-reactions since it came to power with weapons smuggled from Ukraine. We'll have to wait to see how it turns out. I guess the speed in which the SAA "disappeared" is the speed at which it reformed. --14:19, 7 March 2025 (UTC)


International actions, anyone?

There are some vague signs, like closed door UNSC consultations, but unclear whether anything good is coming. There was always a link between Ukraine and Syria, like, if headlocked on Ukraine, go on some coordinated sorties in Syria, make some alliances and security protocols, etc, strike or break something once in a while, and blame the others thereafter. Although great powers always had the capacity to sort such things out, it was never their actual goal, and so it never was going to be sorted out

I guess, some positive coordinated US-RU action can reduce overall mess and screw-up somewhat, and give some hope that signs of intelligent life form can be someday found.

Yes, the greater power can give the lesser power(s) once again some chores to run for its benefit. That would not be much resisted perhaps, but can it work in the longer run, or whether there is a realistic alternative, remains to be found --Resup (talk) 05:12, 11 March 2025 (UTC)

Sources

He's an excellent analyst and very well connected, so I'm really happy to read that it all seems to go into the direction I wished for. --CE (talk) 13:40, 23 December 2018 (UTC)
  • The Threat to Rojava, An Anarchist in Syria Speaks on the Real Meaning of Trump’s Withdrawal, crimethinc.com, Dec. 28, 2018
    Author provides his perspective on multi-side events in Syria in general --Resup (talk) 09:36, 4 January 2019 (UTC)
  • Lindsey Graham and Donald Trump talked on some 'smart ways in Syria', leaving Graham happy enough, according to US mass media -WaPo , 30 Dec, CNN, Dec. 30, 2018 for whatever that really means... --Resup (talk) 09:49, 31 December 2018 (UTC)
  • Donald Trump on twitter ... we’re slowly sending our troops back home to be with their families, while at the same time fighting ISIS remnants (part of a series of tweets)
    --Resup (talk) 16:44, 31 December 2018 (UTC)
  • Kurdish partisan Jacob Reamer-Cassad, Jabuary 6, 2019
    The Kurdistan Workers Party confirmed that German citizen Jacob Reamer, who came from Germany to Kurdistan to fight for the freedom of Kurds, was killed in a battle with Turkish troops.
    --Resup (talk) 00:28, 7 January 2019 (UTC)
  • A Force for Good: America Reinvigorated in the Middle East -Michael R. Pompeo , Secretary of State, The American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt, January 10, 2019
    When Bashar Assad unleashed terror upon ordinary Syrians and barrel-bombed civilians with sarin gas, a true echo of Saddam Hussein’s gassing of the Kurdish people, we...
    --Resup (talk) 19:27, 12 January 2019 (UTC)
  • Russian source: Terrorists preparing for new chemical attacks in Syria SANA, January 15, 2019
  • American military killed in Syria - Rusvesna, January 16, 2019. Top photo is from Iraq war time, e,g, here. Several videos in the end (some by ANHA) apparently related to the event.
  • 21 Jan. 2019. It is reported that 5 SDF soldiers of a joint Kurdish-US patrol were killed. Some reports say 2 US soldiers were wounded, while the official report states that there are no US casualties, ie no US soldiers killed (Kurdistan 24, Rusvesna, SOHR)
  • Brett McGurk, former special envoy for the anti-ISIS coalition: 'ISIS is not defeated' -CNN, undated/January 2019
    Goes after Turkey support of 'bad' groups, laments drastic changes of US policies --Resup (talk) 08:30, 23 January 2019 (UTC)
  • BBC journo Riam Dalati : After almost 6 months of investigations, i can prove without a doubt that the #Douma Hospital scene was staged. No fatalities occurred in the hospital. All the #WH, activists and people i spoke to are either in #Idlib or #EuphratesShield areas. Only one person was in #Damascus, as appeared on Twitter, 13 February, 2019 --Resup (talk) 00:16, 14 February 2019 (UTC)
The twitter account is now set to private but I've seen that his claims had something to do with this ultra-long piece by James Harkin on The Intercept from February 9, who seems to have come to the same (obvious) conclusion. Briefly skimmed the thing and found some "but but but never forget that Assad did drop chlorine barrel bombs on his own people" save-the-narrative red flags. Maybe someone else feels like digging into this. I don't. --CE (talk) 14:39, 14 February 2019 (UTC)
  • President Trump Holds News Conference at Conclusion of G-7 Summit , August 26, 2019, around 54:17 on the video:
    It was the red line in the sand and Obama said never violate the red line in the sand and then they went ahead and they killed many children with gas . It was terrible and he did nothing about it. I did and I was there years later. I did something about it but I was there late . --Resup (talk) 17:50, 26 August 2019 (UTC)

Pierre Piccinin da Prata

  • Syria Times, 16 March, 2019
    Pierre Piccinin da Prata, the Belgian War reporter and Editor-in-Chief of The Maghreb and Orient Courier, held hostage with Italian war reporter Domenico Quirico by Syrian ‘rebels’ for five months, eavesdropped a conversation through a closed door- between their jailers about the chemical weapon attack and saying that President al-Assad was not responsible for Ghouta Sarin gas attack.

This may add to what's known, but some problem with the way it is published, no video, Syrian original source (then reposted elsewhere). Critics may say, what they usually say (propaganda, variant Stockholm syndrome, etc). It would be better if coming from him directly, best on video, especially since he is an editor of some info-resources 1, 2. Could not quickly located this on his pages. --16:22, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

I've posted this already where it belongs. --CE (talk) 17:13, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

Prigozhin?

11 Jan. 2020 Russian and German media report that Evgenii Prigozhin is arrested in Munich, each quoting the other as the source --Resup (talk) 14:36, 11 January 2020 (UTC) The news was later denied

"On the road to Damascus

Assad joked, suggesting that "if Trump passes along this road, everything will become normal with him too." Vladimir Putin immediately responded: "Invite him, he will come." “I'm ready,” Assad said. “I'll tell him,” Putin assured. Presidents also visited the Umayyad Mosque, known as the Great Mosque of Damascus - here --Resup (talk) 14:22, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

Turkey

As robo-translated. The headlines from Erdogan's statement are as follows:

“With the last attack, the number of martyrs we have given in Idlib has reached 14 and the number of injured 45 to date. Turkey will remain a spectator to this situation. In Idlib , most of the attacks, along with the regime and the Russians , target civilian people, not terrorists. The aim is to move the people of the region to the border of our country in order to occupy easily, to empty the field. ”

'We will hit the regime powers everywhere' “For a while these attacks started to target our soldiers directly. If this is the case, we will act according to the facts on the field, not just words. We are determined to pull the regime behind our observation limits by the end of February. We will do this without any distraction. We will do whatever we need to do immediately, without waiting for the results of the endless meetings. We have given the message that the opposition groups in the region will act uncorruptedly and treat those who attack the regime without compromise. We will no longer tolerate anyone's provocations. ”

“I declare that if our soldiers at the observation points and elsewhere suffer the slightest damage, we will shoot regime forces everywhere without being bound by the Idlib and Sochi memorandum.”

Opolchenie people (Strelkov) continue to express criticism and concern over a possibility of a direct clash between Russian and Turkish forces. A view is expressed that neither side really wants this to happen. Advances in Saraqib are attributed to Hezbollah (like in MEM here) + Russian PMC + SAA, with some support by the Russian airforce. --Resup (talk) 19:54, 4 March 2020 (UTC)

Missile marking appears to be 9M78M or 9M79M. The latter would be Tochka U; the former is a less known Soviet cruise missile (оперативно-тактическая крылатая ракета С-5М. Usage: РК 2К17М (ФКР-2М)), according to contemporary indexation. Greater resemblance with Tocka , I'd say --Resup (talk) 14:41, 6 March 2021 (UTC)