Talk:U.S. missile strike on Syria (2018)

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This is a talk page for discussing U.S. missile strike on Syria (2018). For sources, claims and narratives see the main page. (To see what is hot, see recent changes)


  • An Interview with Retired Russian General Evgeny Buzhinsky -National Interest, April 4, 2018
    Evgeny Buzhinsky: It is very difficult to predict, but I am sure that any military confrontation will end up with the use of nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. I don’t believe that a nuclear confrontation can be controlled; this is an illusion on the part of the United States.
    As Buzhinsky say, Gerasimov is serious in saying that launchers will be targeted, but this is incomplete. Russian forces in the region are outgunned with numerous US bases in Mediterranean + Indian Ocean (and I'd say, as Strelkov does too, their sandbox forpost is misplaced). Even with hardware equal, and spirit superior, they cannot military defeat opponent's forces in a localized conflict, but losing is not affordable either. So the conflict will not be localized, and it is not possible for genuine warfare to stay conventional, because Russian conventional forces will be outgunned. So with military tools there is no way to go but nuclear (which gives some hope that despite some TV and twittering excesses no hot conflict will happen at all) --Resup (talk) 18:08, 8 April 2018 (UTC)

Poisoning of Sergei Skripal = land-bridge to Israel

The Kirkuk–Tripoli pipeline pipeline with pumping stations
Likely route of coordinated U.S. and ISIS attacks.
I have an outlandish theory about the Poisoning of Sergei Skripal‎ that I will start outlining here. (Now published online on The Duran)

Russia, Turkey and the United States have come to a tacit agreement that the final settlement of the Syrian civil war will include population transfers, where isolated problem populations are "ethnically cleansed" and moved to larger, economically and logistically more viable larger enclaves. The relationship of these "cantons" to each other and to the Syrian state will be a matter for the political peace negotiations.

The United States did not protest the ethnical cleansing of Afrin of its almost exclusively Kurdish population. These Kurds are needed to strengthen the U.S. occupation zone east of the Euphrates. America nor Israel has any use for Afrin, especially since dreams of a Kurdish or ISIS corridor to the Mediterranean have permanently been curtailed. On the other hand, the U.S. has shown its willingness to massacre hundreds of Syrians and Russians to demonstrate its ownership of some key points of Syrian geography. The locations of these points of contention might reveal a grand geopolitical scheme of the U.S. and its allies. The points:

  • Everything east of the Euphrates, including the eastern bank of Deir ez-Zor.
  • The oilfields east of Deir ez-Zor.
  • Al Tanf border crossing and surrounding area on the main road from Damascus to Baghdad.
  • The Daraa border crossing, just south of Daraa.

Several key places are held by ISIS, possibly with the tacit support of USA.

It is claimed that the reason the U.S. needs to occupy the Al Tanf border crossing is to block the land corridor between Iran and Lebanon and thus prevent Iran from supplying Hezbollah. The real reason may be different. If pro-U.S. and pro Israel forces managed to take control of the Syrian side of the Jordan–Syria and the Iraq–Syria borders then it would enable Israel to supply a Kurdish protectorate in eastern Syria. The area from the rebel enclave around Daraa to Abu Kemal on the Euphrates is mainly desert. If pipelines could be built on this strip of land then Israel could steal oil from "Kurdish" oilfields and even water from the Euphrates.

The United States may be about to start a land invasion of Syria. The offensive would start from the U.S. base at the Al Tanf border crossing and extend through Abu Kemal to the American and Kurdish-held areas on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. The troops would be supplied through Jordan. It is possible that Britain would also take part in this operation.

The 2,400 man strong U.S. 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in Haifa in Israel on March 14, 2018 aboard the three US Navy ships of the Iwo Jima amphibious ready group. The Marines may be on their way to the Al Tanf base through Jordan. Another 200 U.S. troops are said to have arrived in Al Tanf the previous week. Unconfirmed rumors claim that an additional 2,300 British troops also arrived at the base along with Challenger tanks and Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters.

The attack would start with with a massive cruise missile launch on Damascus from NATO warships. The ships are said to be assembling in the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Russia has promised to retaliate against any ships launching missiles at Syria. This warning was first stated by the Russian General Staff on March 13 and again on March 17. The missile attack would however be only the first part of a NATO attack. It would be quickly followed by a land invasion from Al Tanf. As I am writing this, I hear talk of even larger attack plans.

Attacks by the U.S. and U.S. proxies have the tendency to coincide with ISIS attacks in the same area. ISIS has recently launched massive attacks along the Euphrates river and more may be planned.

Any Western aggression on Syria would have to be preceded by a false-flag provocation by Syrian opposition forces. Britain pays lip service to international law and it could not launch a war of aggression without an effective propaganda campaign. Russia claims to have information that a staged chemical weapons attack is being prepared. The March 17th warning specifically says that the preparations are happening in southern Syria near the Jordanian border under U.S. supervision.

It now seems evident that to real reason for the poisoning of Sergei Skripal‎ was to drum up British support for a war against Syria and Russia. One must must thus ask who would most gains from such a war. If the above analysis is correct, then the answer would be Israel.

-- Petri Krohn (talk) 09:39, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

Did Israel poison Sergei Skripal?

Several things make Israel a likely suspect for the poisoning:

  1. Israel has a long history of assassinations abroad.
  2. Israel is not a OPCW member and has an active CW program.
  3. Mossad can preform hostile actions in Britain and still be counted as friendlies. If they got caught in the act, they would simply be deported in secrecy.
  4. There are similarities the Skripal poisoning and the 1997 poisoning of Khaled Mashal in Jordan. The poison used may be the same fentanyl based mixture.
  5. Netanyahu is the current prime minister of Israel. He also ordered the 1997 assassination attempt on Mashal.

The thing that really made me suspect Israel was the claim by Boris Johnson that Russia has a secret program that develops novichok type chemical weapons for assassinations. It is most likely true that Russian laboratories have been working on novichoks, like all major weapons laboratories in the West. The part about assassinations is disinformation.

I do not think the British found out about the alleged Russian program by themselves. They received the information, along with the disinformation from a foreign intelligence service. Most likely this was Israeli Mossad. Why would Mossad feed the British lies about a Russian assassination program, unless they wanted to pin their own assassinations on Russia. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 18:17, 19 March 2018 (UTC)


Preventing Iranian bridge to Lebanon, yes, oil, maybe. With the new Sec. Stat in town they need to figure out what they are up to. Trump, unlike Tllerson, said US is there to fight IS only, but it may be conditioned on something happening by itself (by Saudis, say) --10:23, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

There was (some claim) about the Gladio B thing, but the Turks got rotten, so Gladio C of sort is needed. Ukrainians too far to be of help in the ME, unless their GM version is successfully developed. --Resup (talk) 10:29, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

As for the plot above:

  • Troops in Israel are explained by maneuvers. Sometimes, official explanations are accurate
  • US is not in the mind set of unnecessary adventures. It is busy with domestic agenda and well-defined threats (Korea, Iran). It is managed in a business manner, investment-profit (or intuitively defined domestic value). Using US army to capture and run oil fields in badlands is not a very profitable business, compared to alternatives like investing in infrastructure or military technologies in USA (but not in the military quagmires).
  • Skripal may be slower and more subtle approach, basically to wrong-foot Russia enough so that Russia-free OPCW is put in place, and used for whatever geopolitical leveraging is desired. Like an extended version of Olympics,- Russians probably did some wrong things in sports (or whatever, I am not into that)--but the penalty applied was far greater than the crime, with top athletes with no violations and on track for gold banned in troves, with remaining ones weakened and white-flagged . Similarly here, even if Skripal is a crude false flag, some wrongs can be found, or claimed, and a big profit made out of it.
  • The fact that British did not want to share samples with Russia, but shared with OPCW, points toward such scenario.

(to be continued, maybe) --Resup (talk) 16:18, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

  • Israel is of introverted mindset and is driven by security (+alliances, and sometimes revenge), not by geopolitical expansionism. If Skripal is a false flag, most likely it is planted under the auspices of the neocon West, either directly or delegated, as an episode of the overall imperial geopolitics. This is consistent with how this episode was used, with most of the play (so far at least) between Russia and the West, not something in Syria.--Resup (talk) 07:32, 27 August 2018 (UTC)

As for Boris Johnson and Israel, above

Regarding Johnson's claims, above

That was claimed by Mirzayanov in one of his writings, that there was a parallel CW program by the services in USSR/Russia.

Параллельно это разрабатывало КГБ, ФСБ. (KGB, FSB developed that in parallel-Mirzayanov).

And I think the whole point of a false flag, if such, is to use smth traceable to Russia, not to use another poison; a number of countries/labs could do it; research quantity under 100 g does not fall under the convention.

--Resup (talk) 20:03, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

Did Syrian air defenses hit thin air?

It is possible, that Syrian air defenses wasted 112 missiles firing at imaginary targets created by radar jaming and electronic countermeasures. To argue otherwise we would need to see photos of the downed missiles. So far we have seen nothing but fakes, with the exception of a few missile parts that might have come from a missile that hits its target.

We know for a fact that anti-aircraft missiles were fired during the FUKUS attack.

  • Russian journalists visited the Dumayr airbase and interviewed Major Mohammed Saidi, crew chief of the BUK missile systems at the base. He claims they shot down 12 incoming missiles, but admits that it was difficult to distinguish the real missiles from the "deception targets". (See KP and Vesti News, both in English)
  • @WaelAlRussi on Twitter shows empty missile canisters from a Pantsir-S1/2 system.

It may be that the airbases were targeted only because they have the strongest point defense systems that would be the first to react to the electronic warfare.

There was another phantom attack on the night between the 16th and 17th of April, evidently launched by Israel. First the target was the T4 airbase. Then Al Shayrat then Dumayr. Then all of them. Then none of them. Russia says the whole attack was a false alarm. But evidently the ghost missiles managed to hit the Dumayr airbase twice. Who knows?

The only facts that support the Russian version of events are that 1) they claim a higher interception rate for newer systems, 2) some of the alleged hits were made by the Strela-10 which used optical targeting and that 3) Russia put their credibility on the line. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 22:11, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

Some points. Technical. (1) Western claim; Syrian air defense missiles were fired after all targets were hit. (2) Satellite photo from the 3 declared targets (eg here) do not support an attack by 105 missiles, at least with standard explosive warheads (3) there are some videos showing missile explosions in night sky, which would be consistent with successful intercepts, but not a proof of it ( could be hitting decoy targets, or self-destruct). One such video embedded here (Russ. opposition flavor & highly critical of Russia/Syria) and there are several different such videos on youtube, 1, 2, etc (4) Two unexploded/well preserved Western missiles were found, said to be transferred to Russia; details not provided (5) there's a speculation that new cruise missiles were EMP pulse ones. However, eg Buks are tank platform based, electronics inside will be screened, and it will be a bit like a shot against modern gadgetry like cell phones/ipads/etc. There is no particular evidence that air defenses were affected by EMP (although there was an apparent air defenses false alarm shortly after, somehow). (6) Perhaps missiles were not shot but deflected by radio-electronic warfare; but no specific evidence for that.

General. In wars, everybody lies. It is more important for Russia/Syria to create a positive image of the event, that enemy efforts failed, than to present a scientific-grade account of the event. Likewise, Western media presentations are designed to create an image of strength and success (while the accuracy is lost at the point of justification and blaming already, and repaired by pronouncements on lying Russia peddling fake news, or similar stuff like here on BBC. --Resup (talk) 20:40, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Some more analysis: -- Petri Krohn (talk) 18:07, 23 April 2018 (UTC)

Reverse-engineering Russian numbers

  • There is no proof that any military airports were actually targeted by the missile strike. Instead, the numbers may simply be the score card for the air defense units on each military airport.
  • The numbers for the Barzah research center may come from recording the blasts from online and webcam videos.
  • Most likely each air defense unit used only one or only a few different types of missiles.
  • The BUK unit at Al-Dumayr Military Airport claimed 12 hits. This would be the full missile load of 2 BUK TELARs and one BUK TEL, the typical makeup of a BUK battery.
  • More information is needed on what type of missiles are stationed at which airbase.
Reverse-engineering Russian numbers
Air defense unit Missed targets Pantsir-S1 BUK OSA S-125 Strela-10 Kvadrat S-200 Hits total
Damascus International Airport 0 4 + (0) 4
Baly Military Airport 0 18 + (2) 18
Al-Dumayr Military Airport 0 12 + (?) source 12
Shayarat Military Airport 0 12 + (?) 12
Tiyas airfield (T-4) 0 2 + (3) 2
Mezzeh Military Airport 4 5
Homs Military Airport 3 2 + (3) 11 + (10) 13
Genaral Damascus area 25 5 + (6) 0 + (8) 5
Missiles total / Hits + (fired but missed target) 32 23 + (2) 24 + (5) 5 + (6) 5 + (8) 3 + (2) 11 + (10) 0 + (8) 71 + (41) = 112

On how an actual US-Russia clash is not a good idea

US-Russia clash is not a good idea. (1) Russian forces in Syria are outnumbered (smaller fleet overall, lots of US bases, etc). If they persist (and with erratic US president with no military experience in charge), it is technically possible to take them out, and thus it is not such a good idea for the Russians to be asking for it, despite any high moral grounds and higher fighting spirits. (2.1) But taking this force out is not such a good idea either. Neither side really has a room to back off. If this triggers a bigger war, it should be obvious to anyone that it will be nuclear and cannot possibly be 'won', in the normal sense of winning. (2.2) Even if it does not trigger a bigger war (which nobody is in a position to guarantee), the consequences will be dire. It will complete the turn to militarization in Russia and will start a frostier cold war than the one we had. This time around, no high moral ground, and more notable players in the field; the outcome may differ. (2.3) It is not unthinkable that Russia may favor sacrificing a small vanguard force, for internal reasons (consolidation/militarization sort). Such sort of thing happened in the past, e.g. failed storm of Grozny, --or some say it did. This ended up with Groznyi taken by Gen. Rokhlin, and the leadership of Chechnya more pro-Russian than the Russians themselves. --07:32, 27 August 2018 (UTC)

Trump agrees to an indefinite military effort and new diplomatic push in Syria, U.S. officials say-WaPo, 6 Sep. 2018

Concerns on Iran are not without merit. But having a clash, or high tensions, with Russia is not going to solve it. It was Nobel peace prized Obama who induced Russia to be involved , according to a Russian independent-patriotic source (apparently expecting some payback, most likely recognition of Crimea/end of war in Donbass). Since then expectations did not materialize, and things went too far and realistically cannot be easily reversed. But shoot-outs, actual or threatened, with Russia is not going to move things in the right direction, and will move in the wrong one. If there is no cooperation and tradeoffs, it will, at best, end with a prolong period of world-wide instability as a modern version of the Cold War 1 (with a lot of effort and brinkmanship just not to get into the last world war, and all of that creativeness and resources wasted for better uses) --Resup (talk) 07:07, 10 September 2018 (UTC)