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Throughout, a hallmark of Russian active measure operations has been its reliance on intermediaries or ‘cut outs’ inside a country to facilitate active measure campaigns. These actors include political organizers and activists, academics, journalists, web operators, shell companies, nationalists and militant groups, and prominent pro Russian businessmen. They range from the unwitting accomplice who is manipulated to act in what he believes is his best interest, to the ideological or economic ally who broadly shares Russian interests, to the knowing agent of influence who is recruited or coerced to directly advance Russian operations and objectives.

Several obvious problems here. Russian is undefined, first use is, Across history, the Russians have adapted their strategy as technology and circumstances have changed. Who are 'the Russians', and who are not ? Is anybody who adapted their strategy, etc, a Russian?

In particular, Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibits for the state to adhere to any ideology. So 'ideological allies of the Russian Federation' is undefined (one can say they do not exist, or say that everybody is such an ally); then what are they talking about? --Resup (talk) 19:59, 30 December 2017 (UTC)

Новогоднее обращение Алексея Навального, by Алексей Навальный Published on Dec 31, 2017 --Resup (talk) 01:57, 1 January 2018 (UTC)

Russian information

Moved from US presidential elections

Russia is ready to publish correspondence with the United States about the alleged hacking of the server of the Democratic Party in 2016. NKTSKI Deputy Director Nikolai Murashov noted that in accordance with intergovernmental agreements, these data cannot be disclosed without the consent of the other party. TASS, Rus, Robo-Eng, December 11, 2018

  • Russia provided the United States with comprehensive information about the hacking of the server of the US Democratic Party during the elections in 2016. Nikolay Murashov, Deputy Director of the National Computer Incident Coordination Center (NCCTS) of Russia, said that the first message about the alleged intervention of the Russian Federation in the work of the Democratic Party’s server was only on October 31, 2016.
    “After that, there were a number of additions to it, which contained certain technical information about the perfect performed hack
    google mistranslates совершенном, =common spelling of совершённом, = which was performed/committed a conjugation from совершать=commit, do, perform
    All this information was analyzed by us, even before President Trump’s inauguration, our answer, which was exhaustive in our view, was sent to the American side.” noted Murashov.

Muller report

Alleged hacking activities, p 36+, against (1)Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) (2) Democratic National Committee (DNC). Alleged transfer to a leased computer in Arizona. (1)"GRU appears to have compressed and exfiltrated 70 GB of data" from DCCC (2) "GRU officers accessed DNC mail server" and "Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emals and attachments", "which were later released by WikiLeaks in July, 2016".

All descriptions of investigative techniques which led to those conclusions are suppressed and so cannot be evaluated. --Resup (talk) 11:33, 19 April 2019 (UTC)

The best would be to try it in a court, as VIPS have suggested (US or international). --Resup (talk) 14:35, 19 April 2019 (UTC)

Post-Mueller: illegal spying cover-up?

Pretty gross/disturbing picture portraying 'counter-intelligence investigation' of 2016 as a legal cover-up of political spying/surveillance, from conservative sources linked on the mainpage. Remains to see where it will lead; weather Barr will get to the bottom of it? IMO, real problem is vast, poorly regulated data collection, initially justified by anti-terrorism but quite predictably evolving into snooping (and alas, with gross worldwide consequences) --Resup (talk) 20:44, 4 May 2019 (UTC)