Talk:Death of Alexei Navalny

From A Closer Look On Syria
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Body

  • Over 24 hours after Navalny’s death, nobody can find his body. Here’s what we know - Meduza (Latvia-based opposition media), February 17, 2024.
    This does not come as a surprise. Both sides have reasons to mistrust each other. Results of Western investigation of Navalnyi poisoning were deeply distrusted in Russia (what actually happened is not the point). I guess (some) way forward could be Russia-based international (or open, if obstructed, which is quite likely) investigation into his death --Resup (talk) 16:58, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

I guess many people in Russia feel that if the body or samples are taken abroad, then a way to blame Russia will be found, no matter what are the actual circumstances. (Sample) (I don't have an insight on what actually happened). --Resup (talk) 22:41, 24 February 2024 (UTC)

(Regarding the first episode, in 2020): Western labs: AFAIK, full details on what was found, by what method, were not made public. In Russia, AFAIK, no full criminal investigation. While both sides clearly have interests at stake. --Resup (talk) 03:34, 25 February 2024 (UTC)

Time of death

  • Inmate at Navalny’s prison shares events leading up to politician’s death, contradicts official statements
    The claim is unsourced. Novaya is a cesspool of Western propaganda.
    "...But the editors managed to get in touch with one of the prisoners, and he told (etc)
    --is not a reliable statement by a reliable source. It may or may not be true. The speed at which they managed to get such statement from an inmate in presumably high security prison located beyond the arctic circle is suspicious. (It is acknowledged that if an inmate indeed made those statements, and if they were sincere, that he may be in jeopardy and his name protected. ---if). --Resup (talk) 17:25, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

External access to Navalny

So far, what is known that he was visited by his lawyer Soloviev ("two days prior"--on Feb 14?) , and by his mother and father, (Feb. 12?) --Resup (talk) 17:25, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

Note that previous Navalny attorneys were arrested or charged for passing letters from Navalny. It suggests that Soloviev would be under pressure not to pass items (?) --Resup (talk) 01:26, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Prior complaints

AFAIK there are no known recent health complaints by Navalny (ie from his arrival to the new prison, IK -3). Days before, he was complaining of climate (but was saying that conditions are better then in the previous prison). He also complained on being low on funds, and jokingly asking the judge to replenish, from the judge salary. He appeared to be in good spirits --Resup (talk) 17:25, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

Conditions at IK-3

By opposition media accounts, IK-3 is a "red" (admin-controlled) prison. It had typical host of issues/problems prisons have. Harsh climate added. By quoted account, mortality could be elevated, but unclear whether or not outside of typical mortality (and by how much if so). From other reports, it appears that Navalnyi did not have preferential (good) treatment, but no account that he was targeted (beaten, etc) by other inmates. His complaints were along the lines of access to more than one book at a time, more time to eat his meals, etc, which suggests that at least for the most part there was not something more serious. ShIZO is harsh in the sense that (probably) one needs to keep standing throughout the day, which for some people can lead to medical complications. (I do not know whether it applies to him). There were medics on site but by quoted account it was of a minimal sort -which seems quite common, and unspecific to Navalny. But, in case of some serious condition quickly developing, it seems that in reality it will could be difficult to provide expeditions medical assistance.

External interference?

that would be difficult for a random person, but not impossible if a determined and resourceful effort is made. It seems unlikely that ruling authorities have a reason for a foul-play; Navalny isolated and forgotten is best for them. But this does not exclude Russian-origin groups (competing for leadership, or criminal, or Western -backed) . As it is rumored that there is some intense situation "at the top", competing for influence, including by undermining the ruling elite, seems possible. Direct involvement of foreign intel seems rather difficult to accomplish in practice (remote location, climate, culture, security, etc)

--Resup (talk) --16:46, 18 February 2024 (UTC)

Exchange rumors

There were rumors (by Ru opposition personas) that his exchange with USA/the West was sought, at the time when he was moved through prison system, with a brief stop in Moscow. I am not aware of any confirming evidence or Navalny statements to that effect --Resup (talk) 16:26, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Disclaimer by Venediktov, 21 Feb. 2024

Yulia Navalnaia

(Mainpage)

(Unlike with): See Anna Akhmatova , on death of Gumilev (e,g. here ) --Resup (talk) 16:26, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

Accusations of poisoning

  • "Gen SVR" , February 18, 19, and 23, 2024 ("newly developed poison" which "when consumed with food, causes vascular spasm", "tested on 4 other convicts", which "quite likely will be found in the labs in USA, UK, or Western Europe") (no signs of evidence or source , unreliable and unverifiable on its own source)
  • Yulia Navalnaia, February 19, 2024 ("yet another Novichok")
--Resup (talk) 16:50, 19 February 2024 (UTC) -- --Resup (talk) 01:32, 25 February 2024 (UTC)

Putin has a solid alibi

(Witnessed by VD Solovei and "gen SVR", deemed reliable enough to be covered by the WSJ and the similarly weighted Western media)

--Resup (talk) 17:25, 17 February 2024 (UTC)

How come those "foreign agents" do not agree among themselves, on the factual matter? (BC, mainpage)How come BCs are certain on the "GRU", etc, photos and waffling some shit here? --Resup (talk) 15:28, 2 March 2024 (UTC)