Talk:Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17/Radar data

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2014 - Russia's Radar Evidence

Ru MOD presentation, 21.07.2014

  • Russian MoD: "On July 17 2014 Russian radar facilities detected operation of a radar station" Dome " of a " Buk-M1 " battery, stationed near the village of Styla (30 kilometers south of Donetsk).

At the same technical features of "Buk-M1" allow for the exchange of information on air targets between the batteries of one division. Thus, the missile launch could also be carried out on all batteries stationed in the village Avdeevka (8 kilometers north of Donetsk), or Gruzsko-Zoryanskoe (25 kilometers east of Donetsk), "- stressed in the military [(link)(places on a map). Those locations, to the rear (and left) are consistent with what I initially thought is most likely. Direction cones make consideration more tricky --Resup (talk) 02:14, 18 July 2015 (UTC)

  • Roasaviation did not publish their response to preliminary Dutch report, but is said to drop a big hint still: 'In the briefing Storchevoy noted that in the case of Buk rocket launch by militias from territory under their control , it would have been recorded by a Russian radar in Rostov. However, at the time of the accident that did not happen'. (he may have mentioned specifically Snezhnoe, according to other commentators; I have not heard his presentation myself)--Resup (talk) 02:42, 18 July 2015 (UTC)
  • NSNBC July 22:
Tony Cartalucci (LD) : MH17 Show & Tell: It’s the West’s Turn. Russia has now shown its satellite pictures and radar information from the Donetsk, Ukraine region during the July 17, 2014 Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 crash.

...(citing Wall Street Journal)...

In an elaborate presentation displaying radar and satellite imagery, (air force chief Igor Makushev) said it was likely that the second airplane was a Ukrainian fighter jet. He also showed satellite photos allegedly portraying several Buk ground-to-air missile systems in the area close to where the plane crashed. The systems, he said, could only belong to the Ukrainian military. Ukraine has accused Russia of giving the rebels a Buk system, with which they then shot down the passenger jet.
Mr. Makushev said the airplane deviated from its course by 14 kilometers, but then attempted to return to its course, before crashing shortly after.
He said Russia is prepared to hand all of the information it has to European authorities, which included satellite imagery and data from its own radars

An image from that, showing the deviation at Donetsk that Russia finds odd.

MH17 radar 1.png
In the tangled aftermath of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 disaster, two narratives have emerged -- one that most of the world subscribes to, and another that Russia and the rebels are pushing.
Note: one side just presented its own detailed radar information. The other side relies on private company Flighttracker 24, it seems. Not field radar, this follows transponders only, I think. It would not see any fighter jet shadowing the plane. --Caustic Logic (talk) 09:57, 29 July 2014 (UTC)

On August 5, it was reported, Russia's collected radar data and an anlytical report were handed to and received by members of the Dutch inquiry. As Flightglobal reported:

The data has been sourced from the area control centre at Rostov, which oversees the Rostov-on-Don flight information region to which MH17 would have been handed after exiting Dnipropetrovsk airspace.
Russian federal aviation regulator Rosaviatsia says its representative group, led by its deputy chief, has transferred requested information – including the Rostov air traffic data – to the Dutch inquiry. --Caustic Logic (talk) 09:55, 5 August 2014 (UTC)

Russian military radar replay showing track Radar Replay --Charles Wood (talk) 01:49, 13 August 2014 (UTC)

By my NEW interpretation having rewatched it a few times in full screen, The point where the MH17 altitude changed from 330 to XXXX is when it was hit. I didn't see any other primary radar return showing another aicraft. There were then a number of primary radar returns that disappeared over time - as you would expect from breakup and fall with some items taking several minutes to hit the earth. --Charles Wood (talk) 02:33, 13 August 2014 (UTC)

Fucking morons! Why cannot the Russians do anything right? How do they think they can convince anyone with low-resolution crap? Besides they should make a download available. Anyway, I did not find any direct link to the .mp4 file, but some experimenting got me this (A direct link to the flash player):
The video displayed on the screen at the ministry was of higher resolution, so some of the text is readable from the YouTube video. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 12:57, 13 August 2014 (UTC)

MH17 Radar 51km.png

Taking Charles' cue, I took Petri's 50-km-in map and considered two spots on the Russian video. 'Red, last spot before it gets this new marking just before xxxx. I had mapped out the 50 and, as they actually say, 51 km in from the border station. The latter corresponds to a few pixels with this red dot. SOme of the offness suggested here is probably just imprecise scaling, but not all of it. I've been over correlating these points, and they all come out south of the crash zone, like just south, or too far east entirely. Some ambiguity with the shown final position - a north trend that makes some sense considering the orange dot, right? As I'll be noting, there's less sign than I thought of a southern wind (in the supp. launch plume video) or the records brought up elsewhere... Stuff all wound up north of the flight path, with a spread to the west, mainly. If not a wind partly from the south (records just say "east") I'm thinking the final maneuver at impact was a hard left bank to the north. Actual impact, just before the signs of it appear. Maybe at the last blip. (what's the interval here?) --Caustic Logic (talk) 11:32, 13 August 2014 (UTC)

The video shows the time on the right, although it is poorly readable. The video starts at 13:18:59 UTC. To get the exact time add the number on the on-screen timer that runs up to 7:02. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 12:57, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
The Google Earth overlay/markup on the screenshot is wrong. The recorded track is North of the mark-up. It's apparent on the marked-up image itself where you can see the end-point of the MH17 box indicator away from the mark-up. --Charles Wood (talk) 11:44, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
The overlay is just for comparison, or whatever. The red point is what we're talking about, and it roughly lines up. I think that dot too is a bit too far out, for whatever reason.--Caustic Logic (talk) 12:09, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
I have no idea what the red dot is or even the yellow dot. I'm more than happy to use the screen location at the end of the MH17 indicator box callout. It's entirely in concord with the ground evidence that I know of.
I'm guessing the red dot is some earlier guesstimate maybe based on radar data and faulty interpretation?
Boloded above, from the same video, and the same 51 km - looks too far out --Caustic Logic (talk) 22:16, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
I suggest removing tin-foil-hats and accept Russian technical data as accurate until proved otherwise. --Charles Wood (talk) 13:37, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
I would really like to know when and where MH17 lost its transponder?
The Russian radar data is updated every five seconds. (Different planes get updated at different times as the radar beam sweeps clockwise.) The last five or six positions are shown as dots on the screen. Transponder data is shown inside the text box. The direction is indicated by a straight line extending forward. (The length depends on speed. The air traffic controller would monitor that the lines never cross each other.) I do not know if the direction is obtained from the transponder GPS data or from the difference to the previous point.
MH17 follows the same flight path along air route L980 as shown on the FlightRadar24 data and also flies some way past the crash site – the difference being that the radar data is some 20 seconds behind the FlightRadar24 data.
Something weird happens at 13:20:47 UTC (1:48 on tape): MH17 jumps 5 km north from where it was first seen at 13:20:42. The radar screen shows some data that should come from the transponder. I do not know if it received fresh values or is just remembering outdated data. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 14:45, 13 August 2014 (UTC)

What data did MoD use?

Rostov Zone of Unified Air Traffic control.
Ust'-Donetsk Radar Station.
Baturinskaya Radar Station. Note that primary radar view on crash area is obstructed.

What radar did this data come from? Rostov? Or Ust Donetsk? Was it the same Utes-T data "found" in 2016?

Today, objective control information of the Rostov zonal center of the Unified Air Traffic Management System was received from the Federal Air Transport Agency. In this video, information is presented on air traffic control situation in the area of the city of Donetsk for the period from 17 hours 19 minutes to 17 hours 25 minutes (Moscow time) on 17 July 2014 (MoD presentation linked on top, translated from the Russian version; English version is there as well). Rostov centre will use whatever radars it got, and we only know/remember the Utes-T one. I believe they did not state it more precisely; will post more if more is found. --Resup (talk) 16:10, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
Все три воздушных судна устойчиво наблюдаются тремя радиолокационными постами системы организации воздушного движения (bold =audio but not transcript) и Министерства обороны Российской Федерации.
All three aircraft are stably observed by three radiolocation posts of the air control system (системы организации воздушного движения; "organisation" is used instead of "control" routinely here and elsewhere) and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Utes-T includes primary, secondary, and friend foe radars, so it is possible that one Utes system is described as 3 observation posts. This is not clearly explained. Utes-T: always a primary radar, integrated or free standing separate secondary radar, and information processing and transmission. Friend-foe mentioned in 2016 appears to be an optional addition. Three separate posts or a single post, not explained, so we do not really know. --Resup (talk) 16:34, 27 September 2016 (UTC)

It is clear that the image shown is not a video recording of the ATC radar screen. The operator can manipulate the data in real time by drawing vectors to measure distances. The "raw" radar data + these vectors are rendered on the same output screen. What happened to this raw data? Why was it never given to DSB? -- Petri Krohn (talk) 15:14, 27 September 2016 (UTC)

It was explained at some point that this information is only preserved in the format of the video recording of ATC screen, link is somewhere on the page. Now it is said that manufacturer found saved/backuped raw data. (Well, they did not want to give the data, and decided to do it now, if that helps,-- but that's not the official position of RU MOD)--Resup (talk) 16:10, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
No! The MoD presentation is not a video recording of the ATC radar screen. There is a cursor on the screen, and someone is operating the cursor and drawing vectors on the screen in real time, in sync with the presentation. He is showing far too much interest in MH17 before the crash for this to be a recording from July 17th. I cannot tell whether this vector manipulation happened live MoD presentation, or if it was prepared on a video. But it did not happen on July 17th! -- Petri Krohn (talk) 17:08, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
I know, but I remember that was an explanation given for not giving raw data earlier. Like after presentation over, only screenshots are kept. I did not follow every word they said very carefully, though.
TASS, 9 Febr. 2016, and link below. Rosaviation-Oleg Strochevoi: Первичные радиолокационные данные у российской стороны хранятся исключительно в формате видеозаписи, что не противоречит стандартам Международной организации гражданской авиации (ИКАО)
Primary radar data from the Russian side are stored exclusively in video format, which is consistent with standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). --Resup (talk) 17:29, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
And they fucking did not even make screenshots. Or release the video recording. What we have is a video capture of the ATC data displayed on the big screen in the MoD briefing room. The press was there with video cameras, so most likely many of them captured a better recording. The MoD is lousy! (The same applies to the September 2016 presentation.) -- Petri Krohn (talk) 17:57, 27 September 2016 (UTC)

What was the ATC system and software used. I remember reading it is from a Spanish company. Can this Spanish ATC system integrate with the Russian Utes-T radar? (Note that the Utes-T is marketed as a civilian ATC radar) -- Petri Krohn (talk) 15:14, 27 September 2016 (UTC)

I have not seen this. Unified control centers will be under civilian control, so marketing is not too misleading, despite double use. They post as much detail as they really want to, and it is in oth Rusian and English (link on top). Will post more if more details seen somewhere.--Resup (talk) 16:10, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
Here, it is mentioned that INDRA system is used (can be this Spanish company.) It has this line below among other status reports:
Ростовский РДЦ (INDRA) - Ростовский АДЦ (КСА УВД «Альфа»);
translation: Rostov РДЦ (=Rostov Data Center?) (INDRA) -Rostov АДЦ (=automatic/aviation/smth data centre?) (КСА=computerized system of automation? ) УВД(=MoI) «Альфа»(Alpha))
In a post at . 17 Aug. 2014, there is a copy of long and messy post from another forum titled Ребусы КСА Indra Ростовской зоны ЕС ОрВД: (Puzzles/problems with Indra (computerised automation?) system of Rostov Zone of Unified Air Traffic Control), which describes compatibility problems with that system and lack of support by some Spanish folks in sorting those out. --Resup (talk) 11:18, 8 October 2016 (UTC)

The radar type can be identified by how fast the antenna rotates, which determines how often the screen is updated. In the July 21, 2014 presentation the screen is refreshed every 5 seconds, meaning the radar antenna rotates at 12 rpm (or at 6 rpm if there are two antennas facing opposite directions). Almaz-Antey says the Utes-T radar has a "Data refresh interval" of 5 or 10 seconds. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 16:57, 27 September 2016 (UTC)

At time stamp 1:35 on the 2016 video: refresh time, =period, is approximately 10 seconds. (Noted: primary radar data includes two different frequencies, seen on pop-ups)--Resup (talk) 17:18, 27 September 2016 (UTC)

John Helmer tries to explain the differences between the 2014 and 2016 presentations. He claims the 2014 presentation showed data from military radar.

  • Flashlight From MH17 Investigation – Dutch, Australian and Ukrainian Police Announce End of Tunnel; Russian Generals Announce Tunnel Vision
    He was referring to the public briefing by the Russian Defence Ministry on Monday. The presentation then of what was described as new radar evidence turns out, Russian military sources now say, to have been of a civil radar source, with insufficient technical capacity to match the Russian military radar evidence presented by the Ministry two years ago, at a press briefing on July 21, 2014. For the transcript and video of that presentation, click here. For a comparison of the Russian government briefing, and the US government briefing which followed a day later, read this.
    The apparent contradictions between the two Russian radar sources has been marked as a propaganda victory by Russian critics at NATO. The presentation of the civil radar evidence “ was a rather bad variant,” a Russian military source says. “An example of inconsistency, even a mistake.”

-- Petri Krohn (talk) 04:06, 29 September 2016 (UTC)

Baturinskaya radiolocation station?

("Батуринская") It is mentioned on discussions dated in 2014, and with some mapping here. It is also mentioned (in a rather poor on technical side, let's put it like that) recent whathappenedtoflightmh17-Russia lied about radar capabilities, modified radar images and omited radar images. On the face of it, Baturinskaya is supposed to have both primary and secondary radars. Unsure whether it was actually working and what happened with data. Baturinskaya primary ray was hitting against secondary tower at crash time, here. --Resup (talk) 01:53, 8 October 2016 (UTC)

Location: Google maps , 45°50'16"N 39°27'37"E . Directions to Rossypnoe. Google distance gives 263.85 km away.

At 263.85 km distance, direct visibility horizon is at (or above) 5.47 km. (And also obstruction from secondary radar and clouds...) --Resup (talk) 16:08, 8 October 2016 (UTC)

(Also they discussed back than some system called INDRA at Rostov which had some communication glitches. --Resup (talk) 00:44, 8 October 2016 (UTC)

TRLK 8 Artemovsk?

TRLK 8 Artemovsk (near Zaitsevo, LDPR/Ukraine) Appears to have a primary radar of Utes-T sort. Apparently destroyed, timing and by whom not clear. --Resup (talk) 02:04, 8 October 2016 (UTC)

What is raw radar data?

  • Rosaviatsiya, Strochevoi responded to request of passengers' relatives, telling that primary radar data was kept in the format of video recording from the screen of Russian aviation dispatcher. This recording was given to the Dutch Safety Board in August 2014, and still kept in Russia, so it can be provided again TASS ; full reply document--Resup (talk) 11:53, 9 February 2016 (UTC)


There's a mechanism called "kleine Anfrage" with which members of the German parliament can ask questions to the government which it has to answer publicly. Members of the "Left Party" did so with regards to Ukraine and MH17. The answer is here (2MB PDF in German). They state (page 6/7) that AWACS planes in Poland and/or Romania surveilled MH17 until it left the space they covered at 14:52 MEZ, half an hour before crash, according to the Dutch report about the time it entered Dnepropetrovsk air control. The AWACS system tracked in its reach radar activity of an SA-3 surface-to-air missile system (automatically classified and routinely observed "in the whole region") and additionally a radar signal the AWACS system wasn't able to classify. --CE (talk) 11:50, 12 September 2014 (UTC)

SA-3 is an old system, still capable of doing the job. It was used by Warsaw pact countries, but nowadays mostly retired. It's range is up to 30 km, while a plane will travel some 400 km in 1/2 hour. So that SA-3 detected 1/2 hour earlier is almost surely out of the range. (Do they say where this SA3 was located? And that unclassified signal?)--Resup (talk) 12:23, 12 September 2014 (UTC)
Half an hour earlier is the time MH17 left the surveilled area. Given its route I think it's safe to conclude that the surveillance in this case happened from Poland, not Romania (they don't say). They are also vague about the radar signals. It seems they say that the SA-3 activity is a constant, regularly observed signal in the region. They don't even say it's in Ukraine, just in the area under surveillance. Same with the "other" signal. --CE (talk) 13:02, 12 September 2014 (UTC)
The wikipedia article says that the only relevant country here who operates SA-3 is indeed Poland. Not Ukraine, neither Belarus nor any other neighbour of Ukraine. So that's likely what they detected and completely irrelevant to the fate of MH17. --CE (talk) 16:47, 12 September 2014 (UTC)

It appears that AWACS data may exclude (or otherwise) MIG 29 (we quote MIG 29 theory, Pravda article, in the sources on main page). Closest MIG 29 are in Kyiv and Ivano-Frankovsk, that is more than 400 km from the crash site and can show up on AWACS data--if it was there at all. --Resup (talk) 13:41, 12 September 2014 (UTC)

2016 - Almaz Antey finds Utes-T data

Almaz Antey concern included a company servicing radiolocation systems Utes-T, that company kept raw data. In July 2016, they received a request from Russian Federation state investigation committee, to provide any information to Dutch investigators. They found raw data from 17 July, 2014 which may be of interest. On Sept 22, 2016 Almaz-Antey press release announced that raw radar information was given to Dutch investigators --Resup (talk) 14:15, 22 September 2016 (UTC)

RU MoD and radiolocation system Utes-T joint manufacturer press conference. Briefly, both primary and secondary radar detected MH 17, some minutes prior to crash. Primary radar (green marks) or secondary (yellow marks) did not detect any object near MH17 before or shortly after the crash, at 13.20.02, apart from two commercial airliners, well known to be there. (Some of the primary readings elsewhere were caused by meteorological features, but not in that area). After 13.20.02, 3 fragments detected by primary radar, and some fragments detected for several minutes therafter. Secondary radar gives one interpolated point after the crash, and nothing after that. Additionally, on Russian side of the border, an observation drone Orlan 10, made of carbon/plastic, with wingspan 2 m, was detected. Claimed that bigger Buk made of easier detectable metal will be detected too, if it's towards the East from roughly the crash area, and including Snezhnoe. They will not see a launch south from there, or West further into Ukrainian territory. They demand that Ukraine and anybody else provide radar, or any other, data . Apparent hint is made that Ukraine withholding data and yet participating in investigation is setting it on a wrong track in a number of ways (in addition to traffic control and military observation data, and Ukrainian anti-aircraft activity, also missile fragments type, identification of warhead type, and so on). Proper full translation of 20 minutes conference supposedly will appear soon. --Resup (talk) 15:48, 26 September 2016 (UTC)

RT (English)--Resup (talk) 15:53, 26 September 2016 (UTC)

One point due here: its first detection by primary radar was at a distance of 362 km (361.862 distance, time ). That distance is very close to radar horizon for an object at that height (V check). That means, primary will not see something lower, at such distance (even though its technical specifications say : minimal height 50 m; but that refers to about the closest range it can detect). And he is right: he can see something coming onto it from the East, but almost nothing from further West. At the crash point, distance 171.733 km. Will see over there what's above 2.3 km. --Resup (talk) 18:01, 26 September 2016 (UTC)

Avoiding radar

A chance to get missed by the radar: above 2.3 km, get into a cloud, and fly tangentially (orthogonal to radar ray; in this case, on intersecting course to MH17); clouds around you reflect too and you make no Doppler shift so you are quite invisible. Another way, above horizon, make sure to follow the plane, best in its shadow, so that primary radar can't tell the difference. ( Height entry is coming from the secondary radar; primary radar sees distance to reflector and approach velocity (by Doppler), for a particular azimuth, being scanned over). One more way, if you are a missile, fly in the direction of radar to make your cross section as small as possible and signal weak; they say they need 5 m^2 at some, likely maximal, distance; going nose first can get less than that. (Noted: presented screens has to do with distance, not velocity, and are labeled 'amplitude processing'). --Resup (talk) 20:18, 26 September 2016 (UTC)

One of this important points was addressed in the new presentation at 35:40. If Buk is looked at exactly from the back, its effective area for radaring purpose is 3.2 m^2, but when looked exactly from the front its 0.3 m^2 (makes sense, scatter differently, more stealthy in front view ). With refresh frequency of 10 seconds, 3 observations of a missile launched from Snezhnoe will be made. Chances to see it at least once out (or more) , out of those 3 attempts, is 99.98% if launched from Snezhnoe, according to the radar manufacturer. (Well, put it as 'high', shall we). --Resup (talk) 20:20, 28 September 2016 (UTC)
If we look at the missile right from the back, it looks like a disk with diameter about 0.4 m and area about 0.5 m^2. That disk however is reflecting mostly right back to us, into a cone determined by sizes and wavelength. Effective area (compared to a sphere reflecting everywhere) is C (area)^2/wavelength^2 , where C is a dimensionless constant of order one which may be found in the literature. Taking C=1 gives an estimate for the effective area of 4.78 m^2. If we look into missile nose, cross section is the same, but it reflects mostly away from us, thus it has smaller effective area that a sphere with such cross-section would have. --Resup (talk) 10:54, 8 October 2016 (UTC)

Background and Discussion

ТРЛК «Утёс-Т» is an "Air Route Surveillance Complex."
  • According to the English page Utes-T:
    The Utes-T primary air route surveillance radar, which operates in the L (23 cm) range, is a highly stable radar complex designed based on the coherence principle. The components and structure of the complex are the same as those of the Utes-A aerodrome radar, the only difference being that the Utes-T primary radar has different operating modes and a higher power transmitter consisting of four output amplifier cabinets instead of two, as in the Utes-A radar complex.
Is this the same radar that created the recording shown by the Russian MoD in July 2014? -- Petri Krohn (talk) 20:25, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
I believe yes, but raw data now. --Resup (talk) 20:52, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
The MoD presentation contained raw data from both the primary and secondary radar. This cannot be the same radar, as the presumed "Su-25" or similar plane is not present. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 20:59, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
There is basically one 'integrated' system of double use, but not two such systems. Brief answer is that SU 25 signal not there, what was there were fragments from broken MH17. Longer answer, after MH17 crashed and its speed, secondary readings were gone, three primary readings appeared. If SU 25 was also somewhere, it was not detected. What was initially thought of as SU 25 signal, now is understood to be fragment of disintegrated MH17. --Resup (talk) 21:48, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
This is interesting information I think slipped under the radar of the non-Russian language "information sphere". It would be helpful to have sources on the development of that understanding translated into English (if there aren't any already). --CE (talk) 23:05, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
A: It is quit difficult to find it somewhere in a clear-cut format; many USSR inherited structures were of double use anyway, declared or undeclared. One recent thing of relevance which comes up, Russian goverment decree to transfer military equipment and delegate military personnel (of said military control bodies, military units, and agencies), to the Russian Aviation and Navigation agency, including: (17). 892 zonal center of the Russian Federation Unified System of air traffic control, Rostov-on-Don. This is exactly the center used in both of the Russian MoD presentations, in 2014 and now. This Utes T radar is of "трассовый" (airway/pathway) type, which presumably means long range panoramic, as opposed to shorter range airport version. There are other versions of such type of radars too, located somewhere else. Some "трассовый" radars are explicitly classified as double use, but those include essentially the same components, primary, secondary, friend or foe radars and visualization/communication equipment. This one is not very explicitly labeled double use (and it is rarely that explicit) , and is labelled 'unified' instead, but that basically means the same thing.
And Ukraine has a similar unified system; that means for example that vanished ATC dispatcher, vanished or non-existent 'Spanish traffic controller',-- and Captain Voloshin too---were embedded in this sort of double use environment. But information from such similar Ukrainian centre, of same level of detail and completeness, was never received. Trying to make that happen was really the main goal of this latest RU MOD press conference. --Resup (talk) 00:08, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
Thanks, but what I was aiming at is your statement that "What was initially thought of as SU 25 signal, now is understood to be fragment of disintegrated MH17" --CE (talk) 05:33, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
It's not an explicit retraction but quite obvious implicit one. Before, they said that at some very late point second signal appeared which was not the one with a responder, and said, must be a military plane. But that second signal was after speed of MH17 dropped by a lot; and it was not moving at a speed of a plane, and was not moving anywhere in particular. At that time, it was played in sort of 'user' mode, without going into details like is it received or interpolated, is it aggregated or not, and not always made clear whether points we see are primary or secondary radar inputs. Now they go over raw data with all those distinctions made, and there are 3 separate primaries and one interpolated (but not received) secondary signal. So they do not say we see three SU 25's, rather that we see three fragments. It was quite clear we are seeing fragments from the previous presentation (low speed-no particular direction) , and they were criticized but did not explicitly made a correction/comment. Doing it now, but this part is essentially what many expected anyway. It was not clear whether they can spot anything else of interest in data, but the only new input is that they are not able to see other signals of interest. It may carry some information by excluding some scenarios--e.g. they explicitly stated that it excludes Buk launch from Snezhnoe, in their opinion (and provided data for the investigation). What this radar can see is visible area of reflecting object, by strength of reflected signal; it could be that area of one of fragments was close to the one of SU 25, and other perhaps less so; they did not go into it in their presentation so we can't be sure. It is unlikely to really give a detailed signature, this is panoramic radar, it is not zooming on one particular place, so it does not get very detailed info from a particular spot. It tells info azimuth, distance (by signal roundtrip time), visible area (by reflected signal strength), approach speed (from Doppler); more details unlikely. --Resup (talk) 09:06, 27 September 2016 (UTC)
RT says Utyos-T is a "civilian radar station". Presumably the MoD would release data of military radar stations. But if civilian radar only picks up civilian data (and not the military planes announced by MoD), why should it pick up BUK signatures (and some random drones)? How dense is their network, any other stations near the event? --CE (talk) 21:20, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
Secondary radar picks responder signal, so civilian planes only. Primary radar picks reflected signal and does not care civilian or military. There is one more mentioned, friend or foe. This is not described in presentation and is not relevant here. I may need to tune up phrasings later but all of that are parts of one integrated system, in one copy of. There may be some secret extras or may be not, and we do not know, but assume that this is it. --Resup (talk) 21:42, 26 September 2016 (UTC)

This is a regional component of the integrated air traffic control system, presumably other parts are further away and not of interest, official label is "radiolocation system Utes T, located at Ust' Donetsk, of the Rostov zonal center of the unified system of air traffic control" They do not discuss explicitly is there anything else or not, but nothing else is to be expected. Ukraine has a similar integrated system, presumably Dnepropetrovsk centre will be of relevance here. Primary radar data and traffic control audios from Ukraine were not provided, they say it needs to be done.--Resup (talk) 22:13, 26 September 2016 (UTC)

Here's John Helmer trying to make sense of this, without much success. The article ends with this paragraph:

A credible Russian military source explains the discrepancy between the radar imagery and evidence two years apart. “MinDef have their own radar systems which are more sensitive for spotting high-speed flying objects like missiles or aircraft. Utyos-T is a civil radar system which could have missed such flying objects.” Asked if presenting the Utyos-T data this week contradicted the earlier military radar presentation, the source replied: “Yes, it was a rather bad variant, an example of inconsistency, even a mistake.”

So - different radars, but the claim that the "new" radar data proves anything about the fate of MH17 is false? --CE (talk) 18:29, 28 September 2016 (UTC)

Not sure. But Utyos T guy made another appearance today in Almaz presentation (I linked it elsewhere) . But right now, no time to listen in detail, hope to get back later. Possible that there is more information elsewhere, but so far, the only raw radar data they are willing to provide is from Utes. If there is more, I guess they would need to say so officially and indicate whether it will be provided; otherwise, if it suddenly appears later, it may be asked why it was not done, or at least mentioned, earlier. --Resup (talk) 20:10, 28 September 2016 (UTC)

Update on Sept. 28

  • Video, in Russ and Engl . At around 53:58, previous MoD interview is discussed, but it remains quite unclear whether Rostov centre had data in addition to Utes-T --Resup (talk) 23:07, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


As stated at the JiT press conference, Sept 28, 2016, not received so far. --Resup (talk)12:56, 28 September 2016 (UTC)