Talk:Aden airport rocket attack December 30 2020

Discussion
British officials attribute the attack on Aden airport to the 'Houthi's'. Ansarallah did not claim responsibility for it, as they have done for missile/drone attacks on Saudi and UAE. I do not think that it was the Houthis. I suspect that other elements, perhaps disgruntled with the Saudi UAE/STC deal, may have been to blame. Other factions including Tariq Afash's and Al-Islah might also be considered as potential suspects. Some commentators suspected the attack came from within STC. ALthough their leadership were part of the power sharing deal with Hadi govt, it's likely that it was an unpopular arrangement. --Diagonal (talk) 20:23, 8 February 2021 (UTC)

According to the Bellingcat missiles were launched from either Taiz airport or Dhamar Governate. Taiz airport is 136km from Aden airport and Dhamar governate is further away still. The footage from social media they take as evidence seems to be of crude rockets rather than ballistic missiles. What would be the max range of a rocket such as this? --Diagonal (talk) 16:11, 11 February 2021 (UTC)

The rocket featured in the video Bellingcat claims as evidence seems to be similar to a Qassam Rocket which only have a range of a few kilometers. The social media evidence produced by Bellingcat/Yemeni Archive of launches seems to be rockets of this type. The type of weapon the videos show would not be capable of anything near the range needed to hit Aden airport from the areas they're talking about. If someone has more background knowledge on rockets/missiles, please check if my conclusion is warranted.

That thing shown, will not fly further then Grad rocket, and probably will not do better then early versions of Grad rocket. It depends on a number of things, but I will estimate the range as anything between 3 and 12 km. CW can do better estimate, I guess, this given one is a rather crude version. --Resup (talk)

They say, latest Qassams are 20 km range; then it can match it; this is same as early Grad also; (and it is already a bit surprising for a crude estimate, though not impossible, and later Grads do even better) --Resup (talk) 00:24, 18 February 2021 (UTC). Yeah, 20 km is doable --Resup (talk) 01:33, 18 February 2021 (UTC)


 * My hunch FWIW is that the rockets probably were fired from nearer by in the Aden area. Al Islah which have fought in Aden previously would seem to me to be the faction most clearly motivated to carry this out. That's the line I think should be considered, with the official 'Huthis did it' narrative falling flat. --Diagonal (talk) 09:43, 10 April 2021 (UTC)

Should also be considered: The Giant's brigade faction have also been party to fighting against STC in Aden. --Diagonal (talk) 16:14, 29 April 2021 (UTC)

Potential indications from likely suspects

 * Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy - CNN, February, 2019
 * Once the intellectual heart of the country, Taiz is now a tinder box that set off a war within a war last year, when the various militias backed by the Saudi-led coalition turned their guns on each other. Amid the chaos of the broader war, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made its way to the frontlines in Taiz in 2015, forging advantageous alliances with the pro-Saudi militias they fought alongside. One of those militias linked to AQAP, the Abu Abbas brigade, now possesses US-made Oshkosh armored vehicles, paraded in a 2015 show of force through the city.


 * Yemen Press Reader December 2020 - See Cp6 Southern Yemen and Hadi govt
 * Gulf reconciliation means little for warring sides in Yemen's conflict - MEE, January 10, 2021

Al Islah/Brotherhood
See UAE_Saudi_proxy_conflict:_southern_seperatists_and_Hadi_government_in_exile
 * Taiz at the Intersection of the Yemen War - Maged Al-Madhaji, Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies, March 26, 2020
 * Most military brigades are under the control of Islah even if their commanders are not affiliated with the party. This was accomplished through changes to the axis’ organizational structure, including the formation of a new military brigade consisting of Islah supporters, the integration of Islah loyalists into existing military brigades, the promotion of Islah members in the military and the awarding of military ranks to Islah-affiliated individuals who were not legally in the army
 * The main point of tension between the two is the 35th Brigade’s control of Al-Turbah in the strategic Al-Hujariah area, through which runs the only road in and out of Taiz city not under Houthi siege. The 35th Armored Brigade is supported by, but not beholden to, the UAE, which opposes Islah due to its affiliation with political Islam generally and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically. The UAE has backed rival groups to Islah across Yemen. Islah, in turn, views the 35th Brigade as a threat to its chances to control not just the city of Taiz but the entire governorate.


 * Video Qatari mercenary camps and the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen - Im Arabic English, December 29, 2020
 * Qatari-Turkish conspiracy of the brotherhood in Yemen was revealed by Al-Ain Al-Akhbariya and also exposed via the sound of shots from the mercenaries' weapons in the city of Taiz particularly in Al- Hijriyah town with its heights are in front of the port of Al-Mocha and the strait of Bab El-Mandeb they were transformed by Qatar with the support of the Brotherhood and Turkey in training camps that would attract young people and soldiers Doha-led tripartite plot to form forces in Yemen in an operation to go around the legitimacy and introduce confusion within the Arab alliance Qatar also works to transfer mercenaries, trainers and experts in exchange for great sums to achieve agendas including Turkish ambitions and they are secretly hold between the leaders of the Yemeni and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood residing in Turkey and another from the Hamas movement to run away these fighters and trainers through the Horn of Africa to Taiz while Doha could not run them away Indeed, they enter Taiz under the guise of students or academics with indulgence and the complicity of the Yemeni brotherhood


 * Video: IM Arabic, February 9, 2021 - In a nature reserve, about 90 km from Aden Yemeni brotherhood built a military base for missile launchers and Turkish drones
 * Taiz: A Hotbed of Irregular Militias - Khaled Farouq, Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies, September 14, 2021
 * Islah’s military expansion
 * To counter perceived threats from UAE-backed groups, in 2019 Islah moved to cement its military and political dominance of Taiz. This began with non-Houthi controlled areas of Taiz city, where it forced out the Abu Al-Abbas Brigades in early April 2019 after months of fighting.[11] Prior to this, Abu Al-Abbas Brigades, named after the group’s Salafi leader, controlled much of the Old City and eastern parts of Taiz.


 * In mid-2020, Islah gradually extended its control into southern parts of Taiz outside its traditional areas of support in the governorate, including the area of Al-Hujariah.[12] This involved clashes with the 35th Armored Brigade, many of whose members had rebelled against the appointment by presidential decree of Al-Hammadi’s Islah-aligned successor, Abdulrahman Al-Shamsani in July 2020. The UAE-backed 35th Armored Brigade had long been seen to be aligned with local leftist and Nasserite forces that wanted to retain their independence from Islah after the assassination of Al-Hammadi in December 2019.


 * The clashes, which were justified as being part of an effort to extend the state’s authority over all non-Houthi controlled areas,[13] raged throughout the summer of 2020 in areas such as Al-Turbah, Al-Ma’afer, Al-Mawasit and Al-Shamayatayn, all strongholds for the 35th Armored Brigade. By August 2020, Taiz Military Axis forces succeeded in forcing the submission of rebellious members of the 35th Armored Brigade, but not before numerous human rights violations had occurred, including the murder of Aseel Abdelhakim Al-Jabzi, the son of the 35th Armored Brigade’s chief of operations, August 22, 2020.[14]


 * With its control over official military structures in Taiz consolidated, Islah has also moved to create a parallel and unofficial structure through the establishment of irregular military units and training camps in southern Taiz, and along the border area with Lahj. The area was chosen due to its rural terrain, reassuring distance from Houthi-controlled areas, and proximity to southern Yemen and the Red Sea coast.


 * Hammoud Al-Mekhlafi, a tribal sheikh who was exiled from Yemen in 2016 at the behest of the UAE and has been based in Turkey since, was the driving force behind the establishment of the Yafrus training camp in Jabal Habashy district at the end of 2019. The approximately 2,000 fighters trained at Yafrus, the majority of which were recruited from Taiz city, were paid regular monthly salaries of 60,000 Yemeni rials, equivalent to the salaries paid to regular government military forces.[15] The source of the funding for Yafrus, and other irregular training camps created after, is still unclear. Fingers have mainly been pointed by Islah’s rivals at Doha and Muscat as both countries during various points of the conflict have sought to covertly support local Yemeni proxies to counter regional rivals Saudi Arabia and the UAE.


 * After Yafrus, three new training camps were established in 2020 rural Al-Hujariah in the towns of Rasin (Al-Shamayatayn district), Al-Sannah (Al-Ma’afer district) and Al-Fawada’ (Al-Mawasit district). In an effort to strengthen the connection between the camps and the areas they were established in, Islah affiliated-figures from the towns were chosen to lead the irregular forces once training was completed.[16] However, following complaints from locals about the proximity of the camps to populated areas, Al-Mekhlafi’s followers began in October 2020 to deploy the irregular units to areas along the border between Taiz and Lahj governorates, such as Tur Al-Bahah, Maabeq, and the Al-Arf Mountains.[17]


 * The move to the Taiz-Lahj border area coincided with the announced formation in November 2020 of the Tur Al-Bahah Axis, named after the Lahj district that borders Taiz. The name gives the false impression that the group is an official Yemeni government military entity, a sense bolstered by the fact that the Tur Al-Bahah Axis is led by Abu Bakr Al-Jabouli, the commander of the Yemeni government’s 4th Mountain Infantry Brigade since 2016. Al-Jabouli has attempted to impose the irregular military axis as a reality on the ground, merging it with the 4th Mountain Infantry Brigade, which is based in Lahj’s Al-Maqatirah district. However, no official decree has been issued by President Hadi to establish the Tur Al-Bahah Axis nor appoint its brigade commanders. Al-Jabouli, who is considered loyal to Islah,[18] appointed other Islah loyalists[19] in the military to head the newly created irregular brigades.[20]


 * Despite its forces not exceeding 5,000 fighters thus far,[21] the Tur Al-Bahah Axis’ activity has alarmed Islah’s opponents. In early February 2021, it officially launched what it said was the “first phase of the 2021 combat and operational training year,” with a military parade in Tur Al-Bahah. The event intensified the STC’s suspicions that Islah planned to move against Aden.[22] Al-Jabouli seeks to increase the numbers of the Tur Al-Bahah Axis, and has continued to train new recruits.[23] The commander has also sought to expand the Tur Al-Bahah Axis from its current Al-Kumb base in Wadi Al-Humr, in the Ma’baq area of Lahj’s Al-Maqatirah district, to STC-supporting regions in other parts of Lahj, in a bid to challenge the separatist group.[24]


 * The mobilization of the Tur Al-Bahah Axis forces, and the lack of clarity as to its aims, has led to suspicions that factions loyal to Islah in Taiz are seeking to secure arms smuggling routes along the Lahj coastline,[25] as well as potentially preparing the ground for an incursion toward the Red Sea Coast through the areas of Al-Alqama and Al-Kadahah and Al-Waz’iyah district, all in southwestern Taiz governorate. This would bring pro-Islah forces into conflict with UAE and Saudi-backed groups that control those areas.


 * However, the irregular Islah-affiliated forces would need to bolster their weaponry if they are to pose a real threat to Tareq Saleh or the STC. Tur al-Bahah Axis forces currently lack a large arsenal of heavy weapons. In March 2021, this was limited to two armored vehicles, a Katyusha rocket launcher, four-wheel-drive patrol vehicles carrying 14.7 and 23 heavy machine guns, B-10 and RPGs (or rocket-propelled grenade), and some M4 rifles. Much of this weaponry was obtained from the 4th Mountain Infantry Brigade. Around the same time Al-Mekhlafi was also able to secure large quantities of light and medium weapons from domestic arms markets in Yemen’s south as well as quantities smuggled from abroad via Al-Mahra governorate.[26] Al-Jabouli claimed in July that the Tur Al-Bahah Axis would soon be officially integrated within the Yemeni government military and receive weapons as well as salaries from the government.[27]


 * The money that Al-Mekhlafi lavished on sheikhs and military commanders in the areas of Al-Subaiha and Tur al-Bahah in Lahj governorate has helped secure passage for weapons and equipment destined for the irregular units to be smuggled into the area. This includes more than 70 modern four-wheel-drive patrol vehicles, which crossed seamlessly by land from the Omani border all the way to rural Al-Hujariah and the city of Taiz without being intercepted.[28] Other advanced weapons were also smuggled in for this route, including thermal rockets, state-of-the-art sniper rifles, as well as reconnaissance drones. Islah’s armory generally lacks such weapons, being mainly stacked with large quantities of conventional weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles and RPGs.[29]


 * ISLAH WARY OF A HADI RECONCILIATION WITH THE STC - Sanaa Centre for Strategic Studies, December 17, 2021

There are reported to be three Yemeni Brotherhood (Al-Islah) military bases in the area around Tur al Baha (or Tor al-Bahah). Tur al Baha is approx 70km north-west of Aden Airport. The bases are located in the mountainous area south/south-east of Taiz city. Official investigators stated that the missiles came from the North-West. So the video evidence of the impacts would be consistent with an attack from that region. The apparently Turkish supported, Yemeni Brotherhood were not reconciled with the STC. This report from Feb 2021 claims Turkish supplied missile systems and drones are in place at one of the camps. A few days later January 5, 2021 reports that STC militias had launched operations against Al-Islah in Lahj region's strategic heights.


 * ...the announcement made by the STC indicates that it comes in response to the deployment of Islah militants on the heights of Tor al-Bahah, al Maqatirah and al-Madaribah areas under the pretext of freeing hostages. The new moves point to a steady escalation of tension between the two rivals, who have fought in recent time to take control of the strategic area overlooking Aden and the strategic base of Al-Anad which constitute a strategic difference in the battle to secure or bring down Aden.

Given the hostility between Turkey and the UAE, these forces would seem to be prime suspect for the airport attack. Which was executed with a high if not complete accuracy.--Diagonal (talk) 16:40, 12 August 2022 (UTC)

STC factions?

 * Southern Yemen military personnel threaten to take control of Aden presidential palace - Middle East Monitor, December 22, 2021
 * The Coordinating Council for Retired Military and Security personnel in southern Yemen have today threatened to take control of the presidential Al-Maashiq palace in the interim capital of Aden in addition to the city's airport and other facilities...

Also Hodhod News

Subsequently
 * https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1409634255571881988.html  a member of the airport guard battalion affiliated with #STC stormed the passenger terminal and threatened to detonate a bomb he was carrying in his hand, without giving reasons.