Houla, May 25: Who Was in Control?

This page will deal with the military/security situation in Taldou (site of the Houla massacre) as it played out in space (see Houla:Scene) and in time (see Houla:Timeline). As usual, there are two distinct versions of who was in control or fighting whom. Actually, three broad classes of versions are listed below: rebel witnesses direct ("activists say"), rebel as accepted/corrected by outsiders ("outsiders say"), and the non-rebel witness version (a rebel attack on Taldou). The details of what they describe, who attacked who, where and from where, and when, will be explored below, with multiple versions mapped out side by side and compared, along with the different kinds of supporting evidence for each.

At the moment, this is a developing page. More details and citations will be added in time.

The Security Scene
Forthcoming: a map and explanations of the security positions that would usually give government forces the upper hand in Taldou. Whether this held on and throughout May 25 is a central question to be addressed on this page.

The Security posts (listed north-to-south, more precise/accepted names perhaps forthcoming):
 * The Clock Tower Post Clearly taken by rebel forces (abandoned and open to them on May 26 as "Freedom circle"), acknowledged by the UNHRC's Commission of Inquiry (CoI), not mentioned in rebel accounts.
 * Military Intelligence HQ Clearly overrun by the rebels, acknowledged as "likely" by the CoI, not mention by rebels.
 * The Qaws Mobile security post, reportedly based, usually, at the arches (Qaws, pronounced kwaws or kawaws, once transliterated in an opposition video as "car wash."), remained in government hands, the CoI decided.
 * National Hospital The Army reportedly had a presence here that's worthy of more study. Non-rebel versions say this, along with all the other four, were overrun on May 25. The Rebels and the CoI disagree.
 * The "Water Authority" Forward Army Base This is the high ground from which any government shelling would likely have come. It had a small military force seen in satellite images reportedly taken May 26. (more details coming). It too was reportedly taken, and some of the soldiers their executed. The rebels/opposition and the CoI don't report that.

The north-south divide is of prime importance. The CoI amended the rebel story of a total government invasion and rebel retreat into one where they conquered the two northernmost security posts. This gave them open access, the CoI acknowledged, to one set of massacre sites down Saad Road. But the continued government presence at all three southern posts would have protected all crime scenes, by either direct control of streets, or by proximity allow detection and the use rifles to pick people off if they attacked the Saad Street homes. Therefore, they decided all massacres were committed by government forces behind the cordon they held against the rebel advance, at once shielding the areas and conducting a slaughter within them.

Activists Say
In general, the events were described by rebel fighters and allied activists as a one-sided massacre by forces loyal to the Syrian government. The army remained in control of the city, and actively shelled it from a distance with their heavy artillery. Their allied Shabiha militias, culled from surrounding Alawite towns, were then allowed in to do the dirty work of slaughtering families pinned down in their homes by the shelling.

While most of what the Free Syrian Army claim they did in Houla was retreat, there is acknowledgment of some fighting on their part; an isolated clash at a government security post, or perhaps at a couple of them. They do not acknowledge gaining control of any of the posts guarding the town prior to running away under fierce government shelling.

How It Started
As explained at the timeline page, there are consistent features of and inconsistent sequencing of them; Friday prayers, a planned Friday protest, an impromptu fight at a checkpoint (or several), and a shelling attack followed by the Army/Shabiha invasion. The first portion alone has at least three versions, as passed from activists to the Western media.

- Protest, then fight, then shelling: The Daily Mail heard “There had been a protest earlier in the day which led to an exchange of fire at an army checkpoint at Taldou on the outskirts of Houla. Later there was shelling."

- Fight, then shelling with no protest: Martin Chulov heard: "Around mid-morning in the village of Taldou, on the outskirts of Houla, they knelt in the streets for prayers, half an hour of piety and reflection before a weekly ritual of rage and defiance. But the placards were never used," as the shelling started, at 1:15. “According to several accounts, the Shabiha and regime troops [had] rallied after members of the Free Syria Army attacked a checkpoint earlier in the day.”

- Protest, then shelling, then fights: Der Spiegel heard "After Friday prayers on May 25, the residents of Taldou formed their usual protest marches against the regime. But then, in the early afternoon, army forces began heavily bombarding the village from several surrounding bases. FSA units launched counter-attacks on a number of army checkpoints."

In the mention of fights or skirmishes, at one checkpoint (more commonly mentioned) or several of them, there is no indication that any of these were won by the rebels, nor any posts overpowered and overridden. The Syrian military remained clearly in charge, and so the massacres that followed were either their work or done with their approval.

From the South or the North?
Including those alleged witnesses that support the opposition view, some provide details of how the attack unfolded in space. Some have the Shabiha killers congregating at the water works (reservoir) south of town in the afternoon. Martin Chulov heard that “sometime between 3.30 pm and 4 pm, according to locals, the shelling eased. There was, however, to be no reprieve. Witnesses say the Shabiha gathered near the water plant and the military depot nearby.”

One named witness, Mohammed Faur Abdul Rassak, confirmed that, telling Der Spiegel "I was located on high ground and could see what was happening ... at the site where the massacre would be carried out." There were many men there, more than 400. I also saw more than 10 vehicles. Then four or five more vehicles came. The passengers had machine guns and they were dressed in both military and civilian clothing."

This astute observer also noted a move from another direction. "At the same time, another group came from the army checkpoint at Mussasat al-Miyah. The group comprised around 30 people. They entered into the street where the massacre took place. I could see them through the trees, but not very clearly. They met up where the street begins. The vehicles also gathered there. The army came to the site and kept the street entrance under surveillance." He was chased off then and didn't get to see which force was responsible for the killings. Major Jihad Raslan, Free Syrian Army, and another Der Spiegel interviewee, is the only other one mentioning this apparent move from the north. It's not certain where this "Mussasat Al-Miyah" is, but Saad Road only runs two ways, to the water (south) and the city (north/northeast). Around 5:30 PM, Raslan says, "I saw the security and military forces. They were accompanied by a group of civilians and members of the Shabiha militia. They came from the city’s Mussasat Al-Miyah district and headed towards Sadd [sic] street." " He doesn't mention the massive southern force. The street is considered to be a safe place because you have to pass through numerous checkpoints in order to reach it," he added, showing his prior naiivity - the check points let them right in. He doesn't specify the number of this unit, but his colleague (again, who spoke to Der Spiegel) Malik Baqur, said "I saw about 40 people in civilian clothes and military uniforms," who he heard came up from Fullah and/or other Alawi/Shia towns. As he saw them leaving, they "were moving in the direction of Fullah," southwest.

Outsiders Say
The United Nations' Commission of Inquiry is one of the firm-set windows the Western public has into the massacre, but the news media, governmental investigations, (predominantly those arrayed against the Syrian government), and other mostly-Western sources, have helped shape the record on the Houla massacre. This record generally conforms to the opposition version, but withsome noteworthy differences, in places to introduce few of the many crucial facts their main sources somehow neglected to mention.

Limited Rebel Victories on May 25
The UNHRC investigation of the massacre, as summarized at mid-point in their "oral update" of late June, took the basic opposition version of government authorship. However, after looking at some of the evidence, they modified some of the rebel positions, including on their non-conquests that day. As the "oral update" noted, in paragraph 34:
 * The protestors appear to have been fired upon or shelled by Government forces. Either in retaliation, or in a pre-meditated attack, anti-Government armed groups, including the FSA present in Taldou, fired upon the security forces checkpoints, probably overrunning one or two of them. Several people were killed in these clashes or as a result of the shelling...

By their assessment, unlike the unmitigated opposition stance, rebels conquered at least one, and perhaps two, of the five known security posts in Taldou, were overrun during some kind of major rebel attack that happened the same day as the massacre there. However, their paragraph 50 showed the limits they put on accepted rebel conquests:
 * The Government had superior equipment. Evidence available indicates they had deployed APCs, tanks and/or self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and mortars in Taldou and the surroundings. The Government clearly had the capacity to shell any location on Saad Road and indeed the entire town – and, in fact, did so. The CoI determined that the clocktower checkpoint was overrun at some point, but there was no indication or evidence that the elevated post, the Water Company, was ever overrun, nor was the National Hospital...

This is false. There is evidence for both, namely in the testimony of certain alleged witnesses, who have both positions taken in the mid-afternoon. There has been no attempt known of to inspect these areas, or to do anything else, to confirm or deny these claims. Continuing with paragraphs 50 and 51...
 * The vantage point of the Water Company should have been clear onto the Abdulrazzak and the Al-Sayed family sites. That said, it is unlikely that those positioned at the Water Company could have discerned between a farmer with a rake and a fighter carrying a gun, unless viewing through a sniper scope or similar. The same cannot be said for the National Hospital checkpoint which, if actively manned, could easily have made such a determination. [...] Government positions at the National Hospital and the Water Company appear to have had a clear line of site to the Abdulrazzak and Al-Sayed homes making access for perpetrators not aligned with the Government difficult.

Again, the allegation is that it was not actively manned after the rebel conquest there. This difficulty might have been overridden completely.

The CoI's final report, in mid-August, reported in paragraph 8:
 * The commission’s earlier report determined that both the anti- and pro-Government forces could have accessed the two crime scenes [...] The commission has since determined that the checkpoint at Al-Qaws remained in Government hands at the end of the day the incident occurred. The checkpoint demarcated the new front line between the opposition and Government forces. The commission concluded that Al-Sayed house [sic] was adjacent to the National Hospital and lying south of Al-Qaws checkpoint and that the crime scene remained in Government-controlled territory the entire time. Indeed, when UNSMIS arrived the next day and negotiated the handover of the bodies from the site (see the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2012/523, 27 May 2012), Government soldiers were on duty at the checkpoint and in control of the crime scene.

Indeed, they were in charge in the morning, so they must have remained in charge during all of the night's fighting. The Qaws (arches, the old city gate) represented the "front line," in their minds, after the clock tower position, and the military intelligence HQ just north of the Qaws, were overrun. They say the front line was somewhere, maybe just yards, north of the arches. But in the morning, the arches were visibly pock-marked with bullets fired into its south side, from the direction of the National hospital and the "Water Company." Something in the center of the Qaws structure, perhaps the national colors, was also torn down in the morning, and there was black graffiti all over it (see Houla:Scene). Any of these things could have been from incidents on, or prior to, May 25, and thus not necessarily signs of fighting on the massacre day. But the CoI acknowledged there was some pretty serious fighting, just a bit north of this security point, but not at it or anywhere south of it.

From the South or the North?
Connecting to the same section above, the CoI spent some two paragraphs considering the ambiguity of the reports of Shabiha entering Saad Road:
 * 44. Accounts varied as to the location from where the perpetrators entered and how they exited Saad Road. To the extent verifiable from accounts and satellite imagery, there were no checkpoints anywhere on the street. Both pro- and anti-Government forces could have accessed the crime scenes. Opposition activists managed to reach the site of the Abdulrazzak killings in broad daylight - while the clashes and shelling were reportedly ongoing. This fact indicates that routes to the Abdulrazzak crime scene were not closed to them. Anti-Government forces could also have accessed the scenes through fields, or in small numbers. While the National Hospital checkpoint is 500 meters away, the CoI was unable to determine whether that checkpoint remained actively manned at the time of the crimes, and even if manned, whether it would have been in the position to stop a small group of armed persons from accessing the Abdulrazzak homes. The checkpoint was, however, manned by Government troops at the time the UN observers arrived the morning of 26 May 2012.


 * 45. Some sources told the CoI that the perpetrators entered from the road leading to the south towards the dam and eventually to the neighbouring Alawite villages, including Fullah. There was testimony collected that described two white mini-buses arriving and departing from that direction. The lack of a checkpoint on this route was asserted as proof of government complicity. Other accounts described the perpetrators as working together with the army, and coming and going from the direction of the government checkpoints either at the National Hospital or the Water Company, on the southeast side of the village. To access Saad Road from there by road, the perpetrators would have had to go either through Taldou itself, including areas controlled by anti-Government armed groups, or make a detour to the Alawite villages on the other side of the reservoir, and return the same way. They might also have accessed on foot, by crossing the riverbed.

A Rebel Attack on Taldou
A rebel attack in Taldou was reported by some of the alleged witnesses, and is supported by some evidence. In fact, as noted, even the CoI acknowledge limited rebel victories and conquests in the vicinity of the massacre, and in the hours just before the massacre. The CoI has drawn a front-line somewhere north of the Qaws mobile security post, with everything north in rebel control and everything south still in government hands. Therefore, special emphasis will be made below on the contested victories south of that purported front-line.

Horizontal "Shelling"
Various sources of satellite imagery have been presented, by the US State Department for example, as proof of government shelling of Taldou. The imagery suggests a solid majority of building damage around the massacre sites, from the center of Taldou and south, is to buildings along the main street and perhaps the connecting streets. On-the-ground imagery suggests mainly walls, and not roofs, were holed by the "shelling." Bullet holes were also scattered on the walls, and trees in the middle of the street were mowed down. The picture is less like the "shells crashing down" described by the opposition and the Western media than like the aftermath of the Libyan rebel assault on Tripoli, or Sirte, in 2011. Truck-mounted heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, horizontal "shelling," fired from foot or truck beds, on or just off the main streets.

Some of this exact activity can be glimpsed in the most famous video supposed to prove government shelling, in Houla: Saad Street RPG Incident. Clearly filmed on May 25, at about 6:00-6:30 PM, a blast and smoke cloud draw the cameraman to the scene. He's on north Saad Street, just southwest of the mosque, roundabout, and overrun clock-tower security post marking the center of Taldou. As he films the dead and non-dead being loaded into an opposition-seeming van (four men total), another blast draws his attention ahead. Less than one block north in the smoke cloud is a rebel-looking man who apparently just fired an RPG at something northwest of him. The assailant walks casually by the cameraman, not even hiding the rocket launcher clearly held at his side. Two more blasts can be heard as he proceeds south down the street, as ignored as possible by the aftermath managers, for a total of four apparent instances of horizontal "shelling" in that short span of street and time, by just one of the reported several hundred rebel attackers.

More Free SYrian Army rocket and machine gun activity, if not certainly on May 25 then quite likely so, was captured on video by the fighting brigades themselves. (see talk page until incorporated). What we see in these videos doesn't seem to be the big mobile force non-rebel witnesses describe. That doesn't mean there was no such force, just that video of its activities don't seem to exist. But these existing videos might possibly be glimpses of some fringe operations of the same campaign.

To be re-incorporated: The main aspect of the opposition version that clarifies it had to be government forces was the supposed widespread artillery shelling of the city from Army positions on the outskirts.

There are many, many damaged houses, perhaps a solid majority of them in Taldou, and nearly all of those along Main Street. The (non-human) damage however varies from small holes through walls, broken windows, burning, and ransacked furniture up to collapse portions and at least one house completely collapsed.

According to multiple accounts, shelling by Government forces continued throughout the day. The CoI was able to verify shelling damage to buildings by comparing satellite images from the morning of 25 and the morning of 26 May. Much of the damage appeared to be caused by mortars, including large caliber mortars, heavy machine guns or light artillery.''

By their assessment, the building damage wasn't necessarily caused by artillery, even light, which the government was believed to have. Weapons the rebels are known to possess, heavy machine guns (anti-aircraft, truck-mounted), rocket propelled grenades, and all kinds of mortars, could be responsible for what they saw.

Taldou Burning
Some alleged witnesses reported that rebel forces set fire to the national hospital and the woods behind it. There are also reports of burned crops, and visual evidence on main street after the events shows a couple of burned buildings including the military intelligence HQ. If those events occured, it's expected that some smoke would be seen on the scene. An opposition video from late afternoon on May 25, around 6:00 PM (estimate), shows that. As estimated by the later appearance and line-up of landmarks in the city, the point of filming is north-west of town, maybe as far out as Kafr Laha (roughly here). Posted by alhoula samer on May 25, it looks southeast over the town, to the giant water tower by the elevated "water company" forward Army base. In the span between, huge plumes of smoke rise from something which seems to line up with the middle part of main street. The image below shows the whole span, stitched from different frames and enhanced for sharpness. Less visible in the still here, but evident in the video, is a lesser source of smoke, apparently a bit to the south of there, seeming less contained - possibly fields burning. In the distance, right of center is a field running up the hill that looks rather blackened, halfway between the Army post and the possible Alawite village of Al-Shumeriyeh.

Half-way into the video (time-stamp?), there is something happening at the water tower on the hill, an explosion of some sort or firing of shells. The video poster would likely suggest the latter, as he seems to attribute the smoke to shelling, not arson, that came from the Army post he was pointing (roughly) at. This would of course raise the question why the army would shell that region when they remained in control over it for the whole time. It would also raise the frequent question with opposition videos of how they knew to pan their camera in on where the firing was going to happen.

Preparation
The alleged rebel attack was not spontaneous, but well organized and pre-planned. One alleged witness, "the Rebel Defector", who claims to have been involved in the operation, said his activist contacts spoke of it in advance. "Three days before the massacre, the gunmen had been discussing something that would happen on Friday, saying that it was something "special and big." "

In a chilling sign of such intentions, about a week earlier, some images were uploaded to Facebook by the Arbad bin Valid Brigade. Posted May 16, these showed three of the five Army and security positions in Taldou, as pinned on Google Earth maps:

The reason for this isn't stated, but these three posts, along with two others (the Qaws and the National Hospital on Main Street) were reportedly struck and overrun on May 25, giving the brigade and its allies unfettered access to the city.

Attack Origins
The "rebel defector" describes the northern part of the alleged operation in some detail including names.

According to him, it began at the checkpoint on the northern end of main street at the roundabout with the clock tower. Part of this checkpoint was an observation point on the roof of the Baath party building. Just after the Friday prayers, Rebel units started to take this under fire from the north-west across the river. This was intended to distract their attention from the real attack which happened "from the east" likely meaning the road leading from the east to the roundabout. Between the roundabout and the military intelligence headquarter half-way down Main Street, there are four roads leading to main street. The rebel defector describes that he was part of rebel units which gathered on the one road coming from west, which he calls Tripoli road. He also says that additional units gathered on at least two, but likely all three roads coming from the east. The most southern of the three leads to the district Al-Nasiriyah which he mentions as one gathering point. Another one on "the road leading to the confectionary factory" which could not be clearly located by us, but likely is the middle road coming from the east, as he also describes what happened on the northern one. On the latter, rebel units gathered which he names as mostly from the Al-Hassan clan - a clan of local bandits - and led by one Nidal Bakkur. The units gathering on these streets in total are named by him as:


 * ... the Salafi unit of Khaled Abdul Wakhed, the unity of Abdul Malek, the unit under Saleh Nidal Bakki, even more under the command of Haysam Al-Hassan, as well as units from Ikrim Akrab, Kafr Laha and also a unit of the valley in Dahab. Besides these (units), there were still a large amount of armed strangers.

When the people at the checkpoint at the roundabout were distracted by the shooting from north-west, units coming from the street leading to the roundabout from the east and/or the northern "main street by-roads" units attacked this checkpoint, while the southern "main street by-roads" units attacked, took-over and burned the military intelligence HQ. The alleged witness says that the massacre itself was committed "mainly by the Al-Hassan clan".

Another alleged witness we dubbed "Arifah" corroborates some of what the "defector" says and goes into some of the southern part of the operation. Like with the Defector, her testimony went through several stages of translation before it arrived in English, so it is a bit confusing. Here, the better quality German text it was translated from is used as source.

The witness claims to have monitored the rebel's radio communication. In her version it was only one shooter who distracted the soldiers at the roundabout from north-west across the river. She also mentions the group led by Nidal Bakkur and the Al-Hassan clan, also known as Al-Hallaka. The plan was to first attack/take-over the observation post at the hill to give free way to the operations in the city. Nidal Bakkur was monitored communicating with foreign fighters who should do the task of taking over that post. This was accomplished at around 3:30 pm. Bakkur and his group(s) took care of the roundabout and shortly after the army post on the hill was conquered, the military intelligence HQ and the checkpoint on Main Street had also fallen. At this point the city including the southern outskirts was in rebel hands. Consolidating control:


 * At 7:00 pm, Al-Farouq brigade, led by Abdulrazak Tlass, of the so-called “Free Syrian Army” arrived. He had more than 250 armed men with him from the city of Rastan, he also had 2 other groups with him one from Al-Qabo village, led by Yehya Al-Yusef, and another from Falla village.

"Arifah" is among those alleged witnesses who report that the National Hospital was set on fire during the events. This was also reported by Sister Agnes-Mariam de la Croix and the refugees at her monestary who say that the Hospital was among the first places to get conquered by the rebels and add the twist that corpses from there were transported to the mosque and presented as massacre victims. Those witnesses state that the hospital attackers came from Ar-Rastan (Al-Farouq brigade headquarter at that time) and Saan.

According to the statements of the Syrian government, a total of 700 fighters were involved in the operation.