Talk:Free Syrian Army

On the "Psychotic Rampage" FSA Recruitment Tool
At the Lund article, I left a comment. Not approved yet, as most other mostly pointless bickering is. But hey, my last one was allowed on this post. Anyway, in case it's not approved, here:
 * (Lund) “The most important recruiting tool for this nascent insurgency was not the FSA and its trickle of videotaped communiqués on YouTube. Rather, it was Bashar el-Assad’s decision to send his army on a psychotic rampage through the Syrian Sunni Arab countryside.”


 * Sad fact is, this is at least partly, probably mostly, and maybe totally, a work of fiction. Houla massacre? Rebel black ops following a rebel defeat of security forces. The video evidence confirming the non-rebel witnesses all but prove this. Mazaat al-Qubeir, Treimseh, Daraya, Harak, Aqrab, Haswiyeh, Aleppo University, Queiq River, etc. Over and over again, strong indications of rebel authorship emerge when you really stop and look at the evidence. The rebels created their own conditions for the spread of a vengeful, uncontrollable cancer. Since it seems deep national injury is the goal of the West and the Gulf in Syria, this model is working quite well without any “leash.”


 * But anyway, great article.--Caustic Logic (talk) 13:47, 17 March 2013 (UTC)

On the term "Salafi"
Just a remark here - the terms "Salafi" and "Wahhabi" are almost interchangeable because they describe pretty much the same fundy ideology, with the difference that "Salafi" suggests a long tradition which really doesn't exist, and is the term they like to use for themselves, while "Wahhabi" points directly to the origins as the state religion of Mordor Saudi Arabia two centuries ago or when it was, and is considered derogatory by them. So I suggest we use "Wahhabi". Had thought about changing it in the Jabhat Al-Nusra article but didn't do for the moment, and Lund's writing reminded me of it. --CE (talk) 14:05, 17 March 2013 (UTC)
 * To annoy people, sure, but Salafi is more general and thus more likely to be accurate. To me Wahabbi suggests Saudi, specifically. But their ideas get all over the place along with their gold. So I don't know. --Caustic Logic (talk) 00:21, 18 March 2013 (UTC)
 * By which I mean, if you still feel like swapping that term in in spots, go for it. Especially if it's more accurate than I thought (I'm still no expert on these things). I may or may not follow suit, depending. --Caustic Logic (talk) 06:19, 18 March 2013 (UTC)

Rebel logos and emblems?
The Joshua Landis article is half bullshit.
 * While the new groups almost invariably grew out of a local context, and organized entirely on their own, most of them also declared themselves to be part of the FSA. They adopted its logotype, and would often publicly pledge allegiance to Col. Riad el-Asaad. As a branding operation, the FSA was a extraordinary success – but in most cases, the new “FSA brigades” had no connection whatsoever to their purported supreme commander in Turkey. In reality, what was emerging was a sprawling leaderless resistance of local fighters who shared only some common goals and an assemblage of FSA-inspired symbols.

One of the fascinating things about the Libyan "revolution" that has never been discussed is the emblems of the various rebel groups. The very same iconography can now be seen in Syria. I do not think the logos were created on the village level by the local rebel startups. No, these were centrally created and assigned to the groups. Where were the offices of these art directors of the Libyan revolution? On Madison Avenue or in London? -- Petri Krohn (talk) 19:41, 17 March 2013 (UTC)
 * Petri, hey! Half? That's an interesting thought I remember hearing you mention once. Sounds like an argument worth making visually. Icons can be quite general and easily come out similar- for example, a bad-ass eagle always looks good. And even if it's true, it'll be hard to prove such centralization. Other than that... half bullshit, or is that about it? The part about the psychotic rampage is the only major BS I had to call out, but I don't blame Lund or most folks for buying it. It seems to be God's own truth, from the universal acceptance and re-sale by people who are clearly controlled from Wall Street. --Caustic Logic (talk) 00:37, 18 March 2013 (UTC)

Wikipedia
I kind of killed off the Free Syrian Army: Also note this edit from 6 March 2013: The FSA is given all the credit, while war crimes are attributed to "someone else". -- Petri Krohn (talk) 02:31, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
 * (is → was: Source: "The Free Syrian Army Doesn’t Exist")


 * Large enough percentage non-BS that it's worth citing, eh? ;) Good add, accurate enough and relevant. As for the other edit, I can see that as reasonable, if FSA as FSA and not all rebels is the standard. If so, all heroic achievements not attributable to the FSA specifically (by which definition?) should be cut. But that might leave the page half-empty. I don't know. --Caustic Logic (talk) 04:35, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

The Southern Front

 * The Southern Front, Part I – Michael Weiss, August 15, 2013 (part II)
 * The “south” in Syria’s insurgency matrix, consists of Rif Dimashq and Deraa. There are half a dozen or so really strong brigades operating here, most of them part of the Free Syrian Army or linked to the Supreme Military Command. Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate plays an increasingly vital role in directing aid and weapons to select rebel brigades and battalions. This front, in stark contrast with northern Syria, has seen moderate, Western- and Arab-backed rebel formations performing exceptionally well not only against the regime but also in competition with Salafist-jihadist elements, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.