Talk:Alleged poisoning of Alexei Navalny

Navalny poisoning claims
Is the suggestion (from Uglev) that Navalny's clothes/underwear were the likely means of the poisoning? And would that imply that the substance reported as being found on his clothes previously is the best lead we have at the moment.? --Diagonal (talk) 08:44, 4 September 2020 (UTC)

This substance is not listed here as a cholinesterase inhibitor.
 * NIH Listing

Uglev is a retired guy who worked on this 30 years ago, and is no longer in the loop. He is opposition-leaning, as well as news channel which interviewed him. So they just chatted about things, like on a talk show program, like of 1 hour or so length. His comments has to do with him saying that it is very difficult to poison somebody with Nk without affecting other people, as this is very toxic. He was wondeing aloud how at all that was possible, and came with the idea that it was applied to clothes. Then it will be absorbed more slowly and give him time to get from hotel to the plane. Since very small amount is needed, if it's on clothes, his line of thinking was that maybe there is a chance it won't affect others. But this is basically his educated guess, he is not in a position to really know what happened. He also talked about Nks, he does not really know what was there, or what could possibly be there. He is a chemical scientist who was in a military project. I do not think he ever has to do with any special services type things who might know what else is out there, somewhere. --Resup (talk) 09:51, 4 September 2020 (UTC)

The whole thing may be actually unknowable. German lab results probably mean that they found something bound to clolinesterase in blood samples that they get (from, maybe MS/CM tests they performed). But (the other side will say) that they are not confident in the chain of custody after Navalnyi left Russia. (That was the reason Rada commission did not believe Yushenko poisoning claim, for example, as it emerged that samples could have traveled to US, or somebody said that they could). The other side also likely have their blood samples. But, treatment could include blood transfusion --pretty sensible in severe poisoning case. (It is not known exactly how Navalnyi was treated in Russia and what exactly tests were done, apaart from a generic statement that it was checked for cholinesterase inhibitors --but not how it was checked). Cholinesterase levels themselves were also not reported by either side --Resup (talk) 11:00, 4 September 2020 (UTC)

Western labs
Basically the technique will tell you which molecules (and isotopes) are there, so they would know that. It's another matter that they do not say what is that they found, and also, how that thing got in there. It's not difficult to fake, take Nk off the shelf, dissolve one drop in a zillion amount of alcohol, put a drop of that in the sample, then go ahead and find it there. --Resup (talk) 14:49, 10 September 2020 (UTC)

Blame likelihoods
At this point, I have some doubts about both Western and Russian lab results (Western: chain of custody; Russian: strength of desire to investigate and openness in communicating results).

Without trustworthy results, hard to know. However it is clear that the Russian government had nothing to gain from arranging this; as opposed to the West. Local elites and 'men of the 90's' is another story, they had some "dogs in the race", with no real guarantee they will not do something bad and stupid. There is some circumstantial evidence pointing in that direction. Central authorities did not aggressively pushed for investigation, were slowing things down, or at least it is coming across that way; yet the attempt failed, yet they allowed Navalnyi to be transported to Germany. So it does not appear that central authorities arranged it, but they may be protective of local culprits which could be some 'pillars' of the system, toppling which may create serious upheavals. Such version of events seem to match most of what is being observed so far. External origins are not excluded; in which case in would need reluctance/shame of admitting that things are not under control and foreign agents can operate with impunity.

With all this, it would be better if lab results can be trusted and not messed up by politicians, whatever those politicians promote. --Resup (talk) 07:52, 15 September 2020 (UTC)
 * Noted, according to NY Times, Navalnyi will not cooperate with the Russian investigation. If this is indeed so, and is his best judgment on this matter, there is reluctance on both sides, not just on the Russia's side.

FWIW, Venediktov with a similar point: ''It's the same as with Nemtsov. Killed. Come on immediately ... Within two days, the FSB identified and arrested the perpetrators. After they began to unwind it, they ran into Geremeev, who did not open the door for them. Is it clear where next? Clear. Stop! The investigation was slapped on the hands. But first ... These guys could have gotten lost somewhere, in Chechnya, Ingushetia and so on. They were taken by a detachment sent from Moscow, I will remind, either the Alpha, or Vympel, or whoever. With the fight, by the way. They took them on the second day after the murder. '' --Resup (talk) 04:36, 20 September 2020 (UTC)

Navalnyi and BC

 * Navalnyi: The case has been solved. I know everyone who tried to kill me - navalny.com, December 14, 2020 (video with English subs).

I can't say that his claims are impossible. It may be as he describes (and he clearly does a good job as a presenter of his version). The main reason, I do not see evidence of an energetic and credible investigation in Russia to find out what really happened.
 * Comments

However, I also have my doubts, the principal one of which is that Navalnyi's evidence is coming from the Bellingat. (Some Grozev of BC called him to tell that they found who was behind, etc). Clearly I do not see this source as deserving any trust or respect, and in my mind it is established as a front for powers-to-be communications promoting NATO, special services, and similar agenda and to justify levels of military and security spending, not to establish truth or promote peaceful coexistence of different systems, or to advance some another noble goals. Navalnyi's use and promotion of this source undermines of his own credibility and questions whether he is after interests of Russia or after his own political ambitions --even though before 2014 I would be broadly supportive of some (but not all) of his initiatives.

Investigation is based on phone call and travel records which miraculously place important FSB operatives on all the right (for this investigation) places, all the time, no more and no less. Maybe (if so, why their self-security, or whatever it's called, sucks so much?) --But also it reminds of other Bellingcat giving you everything about Buk traveling from Russia (was it Kremlin? ) to Snezhnoe to shoot down MH17 and to return--just to be discovered later that the evidence is at best questionable and appears to be mostly fake.

The evidence of those phone calls and travel logs is coming off, apparently, some databases bought off internet or black market. This is clearly easy to falsify, with serious suspicions that it was happening with other investigations in the past.

This is different, evidence-wise, from Nemtsov investigation, where (I believe) phone records used were officially provided, via law enforcement channels. Unfortunately for us all, in this case the evidence may be unverifiable (either way). Navalnyi does not present primary sources for his claims; it appears to be some digital databases of phone calls and travels --and how do you go about verifying that something like this is accurate.

Another suspicious aspect is that Navalnyi was tailed for many years, after he stated his intention to run for president. But at this time he was not really dangerous as he could be convicted in a court case preventing him from standing from presidency. So that tail (in his version of events) most likely was not for the purpose of killing him when it was established. This casts some doubts on the rest of his story.

With all this together, I do not know what really happened. Out of all those claims, this could be the "best" on the Belllingcat's side. But I am not fully convinced, and I do not see how I can really contribute to resolve it either way. Maybe someone with better luck/more energy could contact Navalnyi and get more details on where is that billing is coming from--if OSINT is of any use in something like this at all (and frankly it seems to be more in the services/law enforcement domain then up to some vain internet searching)  --Resup (talk) 21:31, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

Started --Resup (talk) 05:50, 16 December 2020‎ (UTC)
 * Follow-up updates and links


 * About SORM system (law enforcement only). See also: Lurkmore, SORM catalog.
 * detective agencies about phone billing (legally a private person can get only his own calls info)
 * Hackers can exploit SS7 network.
 * Inexpensive internet offers are almost certainly fake - private detective agency
 * Liberal politician Dmitry Gudkov alleges existence of black market for such info.
 * Boris Kagarlitskii, December 15, 2020
 * Claims: this may be a leak; this info first appeared some moths ago and have been checked; according to some (unnamed) telegram channels there was a FSB man on the flight who panicked after Navalnyi collapsed and had the medics to administer atropin; suspects two groups involved competing with each other. Nothing in those claims is verified, high odds of inaccuracy or disinformation.
 * CNN "interview" with "Tayakin" (greendoored), December sometime, 2020
 * Navalnyi cannot legally stand in the next 2024 Russian presidential elections, according to himself on CNN.
 * Russian Officers Were Near Navalny When He Was Poisoned, Report Says - NY Times, December 14, 2020
 * '' Shortly after Mr. Navalny’s arrival in Berlin, representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service provided members of the German government with details about the poisoning, including the identities of the Federal Security Service officers involved, that directly implicated the Russian government, according to the senior German security official with knowledge of the matter.
 * Putin's answers, December 17, 2020 1, Eng, 2 (presently Russian only, Eng version to appear)
 * ''This is not about an investigation. This is about legalising the materials from the US special services.

last updated --Resup (talk) 00:51, 18 December 2020 (UTC)


 * "I called my killer. He confessed everything" - Navalnyi, December 21, 2020.
 * Navalnyi claims to use phone number substitution tool and his knowledge of alleged poisoners phone numbers to call group members at 7 am'ish pretending to be a person composing a report, and managed to make one of the group members. Kudriavtsev, to talk to him, in a manner partially confirming Navalnyi-BC claims.
 * FSB said that this is a provocation aimed to discredit them and Russian authorities.
 * A criminal investigation is initiated against Liubov Sobol, who made similar attempts by walk-ins in Moscow.

Comments: the video is well-planned and well-made. It creates an effect of emotional engagement of participation in investigation. Kudriavtsev is supposedly a chemist in a minor role of clean-up of Navalnyi's closes after his hospitalization, giving in details like main attention was on underwear and pants, that clean-up was done twice, 25 Aug and about a week later, and who was or was not together with him on trips. His answers are labored and with little verifiable details; for example clean -up was to "apply a solution", avoiding cameras was assisted by some (generic) local police, unnamed local people brought them closes and took them back, etc.

I do not know who Navalnyi is speaking with. I cannot detect details telling that this is not who it is claimed to be. Neither can I detect details confirming it. It sounds natural, and would require a lot of skills, planning, and effort to execute. It is better then comparable SBU material. But also, Navalnyi is assisted and has access to resources to do something like this. So it is hard to definitely judge it either way. This may be a genuine fuck-up or a provocation.

Said to be Kudriavtsev does not provide any details on who applied what how where when and why. He just engages in a conversation which is compromising, even though it is not specific.

Few suspicious things: "Kudriavtsev": does not recognize Navalnyi's voice and manner of conversation, which he does not try to hide and which is audibly recognizable, easily. The first sign of doubt in appropriateness of discussing this over cell phone comes after some 30-40 minutes of questioning, right at the end, and may indicate staging. Kudriavtev sounds sleepy/labored but he remembered the name of person calling him and use the name to address his interviewer --once.

Another observation. Navalnyi's questioning is "very clever" for pulling compromising stuff out, and conversation is not really reactive to what Kudrivtev is saying. While Kurdivtsev submits to being questioned, for quite a while.

--Resup (talk) 23:47, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
 * 8 bucks to get somebody else cell records? (in cheapest version, if biline is the provider) --Resup (talk) 01:40, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

Alexandr Kots: phone number substitution trick was used to lure 33 Russian PMC "Bogatyrs" to Belarus. according to Kots it involved American and Ukrainian services and Kiev. He hypothesizes that Navalnyi could not know who is he talking to. I thought about this as well, and it is plausible. Well-developed talking points should have appeared before the actual call. Navalnyi scripts his other videos before filming them, and shares them with his team, which now includes Bellingcat people. Those or his other handlers could arrange the rest, making Navalnyi people react genuinely to the conversation. All of that was carefully videoed, making a show. It appears that somebody else, in addition to Navalnyi and BC people, was filming, and doing it very professionally, like in the movies. Yes, plausible. (But I do not know it was not a fuck-up. Navalnyi knowingly forging things is unlikely, and if demonstrated will finish off him in the eyes of his supporters in Russia. But he is not selective in accepting outside help, and to use it for advancing his positions. Probably that is how he raised to the top of the opposition. And he is a lawyer by background. )

Makshakov, named by Navalnyi as a lead of FSB criminalistics institute, is an author of a patent on Iprit imitator, for training purposes (patent application title page)

Last updated --Resup (talk) 06:48, 22 December 2020 (UTC)


 * According to BBC: The agent said he was sent to Omsk later to seize Mr Navalny's clothes and remove all traces of Novichok.


 * Which does not sit with reports from August which reported his clothes were tested: "Experts from the chemical laboratory of the Russian Interior Ministry's Omsk region department studied swabs from Navalny's clothes, hands, nails and hair... Chromatographic analysis showed presence of 2-ethylhexyl diphenyl phosphate, an industrial chemical substance," the regional department said in a statement.


 * If they are saying the clothes were cleaned on 25th August why do it after officially reporting lab tests 4 days earlier?

--Diagonal (talk) 16:22, 22 December 2020 (UTC)
 * Very good point, for Navalnyis to answers.
 * Initial examination was by local transport police. They may not have capability to determine military substances. Eg if they do have and used mass spectrometer, it may not have sensitivity to see isotope masses, or not have database listing of alleged substances. I recall that at some point some tests were sent to Moscow locations.
 * On top of this, the point of this release may be to affect hearts and minds of common people. Those do not fully trust police, whatever they have to say, because police is underfunded and is doing, or perceived to be doing, things they are not supposed to. So when somebody shows up like Navalnyi, it's more about whether to trust him then to trust authorities.
 * On that latter front, pro-gov figures are saying that before releasing this latest piece, Navalnyi allegedly was filming on a location in Drezden where Putin has worked under cover in his early days. In their version of events, they (pro-gov) exposed his plans and he was spooked to do some info-release to change the subject. Unsure how much merit to assign to this drama sub-twist.

--Resup (talk) 07:06, 23 December 2020 (UTC)


 * According to this the underpants were with Navalny's aids since August 20th and not in Omsk on the 25th. Diagonal (talk) 20:14, 14 January 2021 (UTC)
 * I also posted a related to this event comment in August, above (mis-spelling clothes as closes). Yarmysh uses word "вещи ", which is like "his items/his stuff". Re-watching the video now, Yarmysh explains that "Navalnyi's вещи" were with us, as we did not check in any luggage at the airport. And then proceeds talking about Yulia Navalnaia taking possession of the "вещи". This sounds like--and certainly this is how they will explain it now if confronted with it--that this is his hand luggage not the clothes he was wearing --Resup (talk) 21:37, 14 January 2021 (UTC)

Strelkov comments, Russian Interest program on youtube, 25 Dec (he is retired FSB colonel, taking critical positions, and retiring with not entirely happy feelings). He does not believe this is a FSB operation performed on orders of Putin. His brief explanations include: why do to do it at all, this is not how operations are prepared - though professionalism could go down (but seems too much); he also appears confused believing that anthropin was given on advice by FSB officer present (quoting Navalnyi and likely confused). It then goes into suggestion that top leadership is not united while lower level is unmotivated, indicating that liberal pro-Western parts of the establishment could be involved.

Joint CIA-FSB operation?
There seems to be further polarization in Russia, with pro-government people taking harder pro-government stances and demanding tougher measures (for example, cheering arrest of Liubov Sobol trying to sound -sample Kudriavtsev and allegedly having an encounter with an old woman in the apartment instead). This is a bit like an effect of AQ attack in an Islamic country, outraging but also radicalizing. While pro -Western opposition becoming further dependent on foreign support. For example, Dobrokhotov, editor of Insider, in interview to Svoboda admitted that phone billing information was supplied by Bellingcat, not by him (he estimated a price of 4 years phone records of one person at 1000 $, but it was clear it was an estimate, not direct experience). With all this, respective services seem to be succeeding in keeping the rivalry/animosity alive (and the funding which goes with it), further preventing chances of reproachment and solving many pressing social-economic (and accompanying R&D) problems --Resup (talk) 13:51, 28 December 2020 (UTC)