Talk:Iran

There have been ongoing discussion of those ever since, and the issue appears controversial (it is not clear to me if (and where) the 'side deals' were all published. This is a rough draft, following those (unverified) claims heard today on a radio talk show, with attempted (but unfinished) googling verification:
 * (a) Iran can delay inspection by 30 days (googling gives 24 to 30, basis unclear, some references to JCPOA and 'side deals'
 * (b) and actually, it can refuse inspections altogether (there seems to be a long prescribed dance for a luminary visit to Parchin, but military sites are off/unclear
 * (c) 'there is a side deal' or 'a protocol' requiring signatories to defend Iran against 'third party' (= Israel), according to a radio talking mouth. Exact document and phrasing, unclear.
 * (d) Chain of custody? While googling, a ruckus on whether Iran is given to self-inspect itself, or, in a different presentation (+different political camp), with enough videoing and other gadgeting, sufficient chain of custody can be maintained.
 * ''The story, written by the Associated Press, cited a draft version of a secret side agreement that’s a part of the larger Iranian nuclear deal, saying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had ceded the investigation of Iran’s Parchin military facility to the Islamic republic.
 * The separate arrangements under the roadmap agreed between the IAEA and Iran in July are confidential and I have a legal obligation not to make them public—the same obligation I have for hundreds of such arrangements made with other IAEA Member States,” Amano said in a statement. “However, I can state that the arrangements are technically sound and consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise our safeguards standards in any way.” (Newsweek, 20 August 2015)
 * Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination at the IAEA it would be unusual but by no means technically compromising to have Iranian technicians collect swipe samples at sites and locations at Parchin in the physical presence and direct line of sight of IAEA inspectors, including filming, and using swipe kits and collection bags provided by the IAEA.” “mainly to guard against the risk of inadvertent contamination from nuclear material traces on the protective clothing of the inspectors”. Labs use “very sophisticated analyses nuclear material using electron microscopes and mass spectrometers can be detected at the atomic level.(armscontrol.org/blog).
 * (e) Other: duration (10 years?); missile program (details?), ...,? ,...
 * Hoping to update, as time permits. --Resup (talk) 02:36, 17 October 2017 (UTC)