Talk:US weapon deliveries to Syrian rebels

Gaytandzhieva has a long two-part article on armswatch.com, in English. That may be the basis for RT reporting. It looks like she got serious internal documents, and I'd rather stay away from this as I do not know who is feeding this serious information (or perhaps disinformation); it can be judged on its merits by those who care to read it. It was also on Cassad in Russian.

With that disclaimer, I note that Yemeni IS ammunition was --she says --routed through Afghanistan, as a shipment to Afghan national army. And I doubt she supplies Afghan army papers detailing how and by whom it was diverted to Yemen.

Likewise, Syrian weapons were sent to Qatar, and, I gather, "tunneled" from there somehow. Like maybe to good jihadis who turned up to be lacking, or whatever.

Now, in the end of the day, smuggling weapons to 'convenient' bad guys, --or not even useful, just paying, is a world-wide problem. There are well-known leaders in arms sales, and those huge sales are to no angels on the receiving side. Likely, considerable part of it ends up with even less angelic characters, not listed on the envelopes.

So, some broader perspective on --and then some distance from --this very detailed investigation --Resup (talk) 20:36, 5 September 2019 (UTC)

Dilyana Gaytandzhieva
This story is becoming a topic of its own. Placing it here for now. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 22:12, 28 November 2019 (UTC)
 * Exposed: Bellingcat fabricate evidence, deliberately hide documents in new ‘Russian spy plot’ - Dilyana Gaytandzhieva, Arms Watch, November 28, 20190
 * ''Bellingcat, an online investigation organization headed by Eliot Higgins, has deliberately and with malicious intent manipulated evidence by hiding crucially important documents in order to slander me as a journalist and misrepresent my investigation, 350 flights carry weapons for terrorists, as “intentionally incorrect”.
 * ''On 23 November 2019 the group published an article entitled, “The Dreadful Eight: GRU’s Unit 29155 and the 2015 Poisoning of Emilian Gebrev”. According to Bellingcat’s Investigation Team, the Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev, owner of Emco Ltd., Bulgaria, was poisoned by GRU agents in 2015 ( a claim which so far is based only on the Gebrev’s words). Bellingcat ignores the statement of the Bulgarian Attorney General and all Bulgarian institutions that there is no evidence of such poisoning taking place.
 * ''Bellingcat goes on further and attempts to implicate me as a journalist in a deliberate attempt to discredit Mr. Gebrev internationally as his company Emco appears in a previous investigation into Silk Way diplomatic flights carrying weapons for terrorists in Syria. My investigation was originally published on July 2, 2017 by the Bulgarian newspaper Trud Daily. My sources were diplomatic documents from the Azeri Embassy in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry which were leaked online following a cyberattack.