Talk:Qasem Soleimani

Aftermath?
For the next year, it may be rather boring and not follow all those end of the world/empire/etc predictions. It is fairly clear that at this time the parties would rather keep things as they are, with small variations around it. There could be a successful limited operation by Iran or its proxies on US or allies, with possibly grossly disproportionate but time-limited US response, followed by another rather calm period.

However, if 'nuclear clock' (enrichment) is clicking, that will end with a bang restoring the status quo at any cost (and that gives some hope it won't happen if the other side is not genuinely suicidal).

It may also happen to (1) prevent a popular upheaval --but recent events got those suppressed, or (2) gross misreading of the other side intentions.

So far, from what I see the parties are happy to keep things where they presently stand ...

--Resup (talk) 01:47, 7 January 2020 (UTC)

IMO, miscalculation, possibly driven by long term grudge/revenge. However, what's really important rationally is the nuclear program; and this all but excludes negotiated solution with this US administration (more than happy to be wrong here). And after all, he was a general on the enemy side, at nominally peace time, and there are some unwritten norms of conduct/enemy respect, not just legalistic "imminent dangers". I did not look into his character but it cannot be excluded that he was rational and capable of a nuclear deal to a greater degree than others in comparable roles over there. This can also make harder to peacefully convince Iranians to abandon nuclear program as that assumes some acceptable levels of 'badness' (or better goodness) between nuclear and non-nuclear parties, and trust in some laws/rules being mutually kept. --Resup (talk)
 * Longer term