Talk:Shahed 136

Mercer Street attack

 * See Talk:MercerStreet

Drone Identified?
The US assesses that the Mercer was hit by a Shahed 136 (according to this source) delta winged drone. (video of Ansarallah drone on display) apparently called 'Wa'id', here Al Masirah - طائرة #وعيد المسيرة - مواصفات الطائرة الهجومية وعيد بمدى يتخطى الـ2500 كم.

More details on US story. Articles state that this type of drone was used in the big Aramco attacks, but as far as I know that isn't right. The evidence from there was not for delta winged kamikazi drones. Yemen spokesman referred to Samad 3 drones as involved in that multifaceted attack. Those drones were likely deploying guided munitions over the targets rather than being of the kamikaze type.

The supporting evidence publicly available for the identification seems sketchy, inconclusive. However, the stabilising wing tip unit shown from the debris is similar that on the Yemeni drone featured here. Does the Yemeni drone shown match an Iranian Shahed 136, if the latter exist...?


 * Israeli-linked tanker attacked by sophisticated Iranian drones - Business Market, July 31, 2021
 * Some of the Iranian drones mentioned in sources may not exist, such as the Shahed-136, which was allegedly sent to Yemen in January, in order to target Israel.

From Cassad - ''According to the British statement, the UAV-kamikaze tanker Shahed 136, which is allegedly produced only in Iran, was attacked. This is frankly not true, since these machines are actively used in Yemen and the Houthis have been using this machine for a long time (the Houthis both receive drones from Iran and assemble them in Yemen) for strikes against the Islamists in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, which is facilitated by the high range of use of this machine-2200 km.''

--

Yes, the drone looks like the Yemeni drone. But Americans show no proof that the drone has ever existed in Iran or anywhere outside Yemen. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 20:57, 9 August 2021 (UTC)


 * The purported debris of a wing tip is at best a partial match for the delta wing drone. The recovered wing tip looks set further back from the rear fin part than we see when looking at the whole assemblage (same also I think, for Newsweek's Shahed 136). Given the damage the blast did to the iron deck one might question whether such light materials would survive the explosion uncharred and just intact enough to support an identification. --Diagonal (talk) 20:39, 10 August 2021 (UTC)
 * Non-charring: possible, impact fuse delay, may break into pieces before exploding. (No guarantees on what happened overall, from the couch) --Resup (talk) 21:22, 10 August 2021 (UTC)

Other claimed/reported tanker attacks

 * Killer drone that hit Israeli-owned tanker was Iranian Shahed-136, US Navy confirms - Emmanuel Fabian, Times of Israel, November 22, 2022

Reliability of evidence


As with the photo provided by the US Nayy after the Mercer Street attack, the Ukrainian photo of a tail fin is not totally convincing. The 'recovered' fins are attached to the rear of the assembly. In the images of the Waeed and the Shahed drones in the launcher, the tail flap unit is seen as independently movable of the rear fins. I suspect that the photos may be of mocked up debris, or at least they match poorly with images available of complete drones. There are twitter videos (#shahed 136, #geran) with blurry footage of deltawing drones. I don't know currently, if Russsia has its own delta wing drones, but I also can't rule out that they are digitally manipulated videos. As far as I can tell some pro-russian sources have picked up Ukrainian claims. With the media coverage any delta wing drone flying is liable to be identified by locals as a Geran. --Diagonal (talk) 11:54, 29 September 2022 (UTC)
 * The debris photos could possibly match with the wingtip fin and the rear corner of the delta wing, with the tail flap missing. --Diagonal (talk) 12:06, 29 September 2022 (UTC)
 * But I think there would not be room for the tail flap - behind the apparent join of the stabilising fin with the wing tip - without the tail flap extending behind the fins, which does not appear to be the case with the Shahed-136 or Waeed. --Diagonal (talk) 12:25, 29 September 2022 (UTC)

#geran2

 * https://twitter.com/Vkyo_LAMDA/status/1579952870798991361
 * https://twitter.com/crispSV/status/1577943773568532481

The engines shown do not match closely.

Russia may be using cheap drones of the delta wing type. But is not clear currently, that the 'Geran' is anything more than an invention of the Ukrainian military or the US State dept.--Diagonal (talk) 08:36, 12 October 2022 (UTC)


 * That may be not said officially but seems accepted by important unofficial Ru sources such as Rusvesna, Cassad (which do not operate in vacuum). There is circumstantial evidence as it's said to be many Iranian cargo flights to Russia (I did not try to check, for not having time, but do not have a reason to doubt). I feel that this publicity is intentional and shows that one of the results of catastrophic Western policies is strengthening of ties between Russia and Iran. That means that in the case of Western attack on Iran it is conceivable that they will have external political and material support, making things less predictable and very dangerous. Before events in Ukraine, Ru elites were predominantly pro-Western and/or pro Israel, and such support would have been in (much) doubt; but now, predominant views shifted by the outrage all that is. PS. An opinion was expressed, did not save the source, that the name Geran' (a flower) is for it sounds like Iran. (...and as a disclosure, I am no fan of Iranian weapons programs or foreign policies...)


 * It probably also reflects difficulties Russia has in producing this cheaply after newly imposed and disruptive sanctions. While Iranians by now adapted to them. Anyway, there is nothing here to be happy about; the war in Ukraine should not be happening at all, it is in neither Ukrainian nor Russian interest to have this war. It's made up, and mostly in the West. With no denying of Russian failure to see it in advance.
 * --Resup (talk) 03:56, 13 October 2022 (UTC)
 * + Photos with credits, and info that Russian spokesman Peskov has denied


 * If you drill down to find the evidence it's hard to find any thing concrete. It's a possiblity, but probably not in the way presented by Jake Sullivan. --Diagonal (talk) 10:39, 13 October 2022 (UTC)


 * Well, it does seem to be that a close analogue is in use by the Russian's. If the Iranian's provided the design principles to Ansarallah forces, which include former Yemeni military, for them to produce domestically, then likely different factories in Russia can produce generic versions. As argued here. --Diagonal (talk) 14:00, 17 October 2022 (UTC)

Role of Israelis

 * What could motivate planting a story?... Ukraine getting around Israel's ban on selling them advanced defence tech and getting access to Israeli anti-UAV technology, by hyping up a story about Iranian systems? --Diagonal (talk) 13:01, 29 September 2022 (UTC)

It is generally true that Ukrainian leaders will say and do anything to get themselves more weapons and other forms of external support (and that they dream of a next 'wundervaffle' to give them the upper hand, with hopes placed on Bairaktar, HIMARS, etc, have been reaching almost fetishism levels. But, (1) Israeli advanced weapons is not a solution against cheap yet numerous drones, which may attack anywhere in a pretty large country; also quite new, so likely no established and tested method or training to target them; but otherwise, those drones are not a difficult target, and they seem to fly in MANPAD's ceiling range  (just possibly cheaper and more numerous than MANPADs around; MANPAD, 60/100 K$, Igla/Stinger; this thing, like a moped, maybe 5-10K$) (2) very likely, everybody, Israelis including, carefully analyze ways to protect themselves against this; but in no  rush to directly supply their own weapons to Ukraine, for multiple defense reasons, in particular as Russia is a main supplier of Israeli opponents and should not be alienated too much; + any such weapons transferred are likely to get into the hands of Russians resulting in loss of effectiveness in defending their own land; etc. It is more likely that the West will provide less direct assistance, like supporting and supplying bits for the Ukrainian, or pseudo-Ukrainian, weapons own/'own' developments, + intelligence, PR`, and all the support they provide already. (+Also, nothing really unusual in countries selling/providing their weapons, and not being entirely straightforward about it) --Resup (talk) 15:53, 20 October 2022 (UTC)

More photos/footage

 * AFP's @YasuyoshiChiba captured the moment a drone approached to attack Kyiv, and the immediate aftermath of the strikes
 * https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-approaches-for-an-attack-in-kyiv-on-october-17-amid-news-photo/1244030448
 * https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-approaches-for-an-attack-in-kyiv-on-october-17-amid-news-photo/1244030755
 * https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/debris-are-seen-on-the-ground-near-the-site-of-a-drone-news-photo/1244031213
 * https://nice.maville.com/actu/actudet_-guerre-en-ukraine.-que-sait-on-des-shahed-136-ces-drones-kamikazes-iraniens-utilises-par-moscou-_54135-5452752_actu.Htm